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The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) allows noncitizens to bring civil actions in US 
federal courts for a select class of particularly egregious violations of international 
law. Human rights activists have pushed the boundaries of the ATS in recent dec-
ades, and the Supreme Court has responded by establishing several limiting rules 
for ATS jurisdiction. Most recently, in April 2018, the Supreme Court ruled in  
Jesner v Arab Bank that foreign corporations cannot be defendants in ATS suits. 
Following Jesner, plaintiffs in ongoing ATS suits have dropped key corporate de-
fendants from their complaints. 
This Comment argues that courts and litigants should pause to consider how 
“foreign corporation” ought to be defined when applying the Jesner rule to transna-
tional corporations. While a formalistic rule based on place of incorporation or loca-
tion of headquarters might seem the obvious choice, it is not a necessary one. This 
Comment considers possible alternatives and concludes that a functional standard 
that determines a corporation’s “foreignness” based on its actual ties to the United 
States best serves the purpose of the ATS as defined by Jesner. To that end, this 
Comment introduces a standard I call the Functional Foreignness Test, which de-
fines a foreign corporation as a corporation whose ties to the United States are at 
least as strong as to any other nation. Such a standard ensures that ATS jurisdic-
tion, which can have substantial implications for both foreign relations and human 
rights, does not turn on a formality that may have little relation to a corporation’s 
actual ties or activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over ten years ago, former child slaves initiated a class action 
suit against numerous corporate defendants for aiding and abet-
ting the use of child slavery in Ivory Coast in violation of interna-
tional law norms that prohibit slavery, forced labor, child labor, 
torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.1 Defend-
ants included Nestlé SA, the Swiss parent company of various 
Nestlé subsidiaries throughout the world; Nestlé USA, a US sub-
sidiary; and Nestlé Ivory Coast, an Ivorian subsidiary.2 In a 2014 
decision, the Ninth Circuit summarized some of the plaintiffs’  
experiences: 
They were forced to work on Ivorian cocoa plantations for up 
to fourteen hours per day six days a week, given only scraps 
of food to eat, and whipped and beaten by overseers. They 
were locked in small rooms at night and not permitted to 
leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to es-
cape would be beaten or tortured. Plaintiff John Doe II wit-
nessed guards cut open the feet of children who attempted to 
 
 1 Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d 1057, 1064 (CD Cal 2010). 
 2 Id at 1063. 
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escape, and John Doe III knew that the guards forced failed 
escapees to drink urine.3 
With respect to Nestlé, plaintiffs described Nestlé’s exclusive  
supplier-buyer relationship with certain farms, arguing that 
Nestlé thereby had “first hand knowledge of the widespread use 
of child labor on [those] farms” and provided “money, supplies, 
and training . . . knowing that their assistance would necessarily 
facilitate child labor.”4 
The plaintiffs in the ongoing Nestlé litigation relied on the 
Alien Tort Statute5 (ATS), a one-sentence provision of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, to establish the US federal courts’ jurisdiction 
over the case.6 In full, the ATS reads: “The district courts shall 
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”7 The vague terms of the ATS, along with its 
lack of legislative history or early case law, have made its scope 
and aim elusive.8 For almost two hundred years, litigants rarely 
invoked the ATS, and courts have found few clues as to the First 
Congress’s precise intent.9 As a result, judges and scholars’ inter-
pretations have ranged widely. Depending on the account, the 
ATS might broadly encompass “any intentional tort to an alien’s 
person or personal property,”10 apply modestly to cases involving 
foreign ambassadors,11 or be restricted to cases of vessels cap-
tured during war.12 
However, the ATS was successfully used to address violations 
of international law beginning in the 1980s.13 Then, the Supreme 
 
 3 Doe I v Nestle USA, Inc, 766 F3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir 2014) (Nestle I). 
 4 Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d at 1066 (citation omitted). 
 5 1 Stat 73, 77 (1789), codified as amended at 28 USC § 1350. 
 6 Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d at 1062. 
 7 28 USC § 1350. 
 8 See, for example, Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths about 
the Alien Tort Statute, 89 Notre Dame L Rev 1609, 1637–43 (2014); William R. Castro, The 
Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of 
Nations, 18 Conn L Rev 467, 467–68 (1986) (calling the ATS’s language “cryptic” and its 
origin and purpose “obscure”). 
 9 Joe Lodico, Note, Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 30 J L & Commerce 117, 118 (2011). See also notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
 10 Anthony J. Bellia Jr and Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law 
of Nations, 78 U Chi L Rev 445, 446 (2011). 
 11 Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774, 813–15 (DC Cir 1984) (Bork  
concurring). 
 12 Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18  
Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 445, 447 (1995). 
 13 Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 458 (cited in note 10). 
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Court intervened in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain14 and Kiobel v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co,15 each time restricting the scope of the ATS 
and casting doubt on its future viability as a mechanism for pro-
moting human rights. 
In 2018, the Supreme Court restricted the ATS once more by 
holding in Jesner v Arab Bank16 that foreign corporations cannot 
be defendants in ATS suits.17 In the opinion, the Court also gave 
a concise statement of the ATS’s purpose. In its view, that pur-
pose is “to avoid foreign entanglements by ensuring the availabil-
ity of a federal forum where the failure to provide one might cause 
another nation to hold the United States responsible for an injury 
to a foreign citizen.”18 
Following Jesner, the Ninth Circuit issued its judgment in 
Doe v Nestle, S.A.19 on appeal from the district court’s dismissal of 
plaintiffs’ complaints. 20  The district court had previously con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were seeking an extraterritorial appli-
cation of the ATS in violation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Kiobel.21 Finding to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit reversed and 
remanded to the district court.22 In light of Jesner, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to 
amend their complaint, and that “plaintiffs must remove those 
defendants who are no longer amenable to suit under the ATS, 
and specify which potentially liable party is responsible for what 
culpable conduct.”23 At that point, plaintiffs had already conceded 
in a supplemental brief that, “[a]s a result of Jesner, Plaintiffs’ 
claims against Nestlé, S.A. [and] Nestlé Ivory Coast . . . cannot 
proceed and these parties should be dismissed.”24 While the case 
may still proceed against Nestlé USA, the case will be substan-
tially more difficult for the plaintiffs now that they must prove 
 
 14 542 US 692 (2004). 
 15 569 US 108 (2013). 
 16 138 S Ct 1386 (2018). 
 17 Id at 1403. 
 18 Id at 1397. 
 19 906 F3d 1120 (9th Cir 2018) (Nestle II). 
 20 Id at 1123. 
 21 Nestle v Nestle, S.A., 2017 WL 6059134, *8–9 (CD Cal). In Kiobel, the Court held 
that there is a “presumption against extraterritoriality” in ATS cases. Kiobel, 569 US  
at 117. 
 22 Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1127. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Appellants’ Supplemental Brief, Doe v Nestle, S.A., No 17-55435, *1 (9th Cir filed 
May 18, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 2299135) (Doe Supplemental Brief). 
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the liability of Nestlé USA specifically; after Jesner, proving cul-
pable acts by Nestlé SA or Nestlé Ivory Coast will no longer  
suffice.25 
This Comment challenges the assumption that defendants 
such as Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast cannot be sued under 
the ATS after Jesner. To do so, it explores the question of what 
precisely qualifies as a “foreign corporation” for ATS purposes, es-
pecially with regard to transnational corporations.26 Part I pro-
vides an overview of the ATS’s historical and present application, 
with special focus on the ruling in Jesner. It also considers the 
open question whether ATS suits against any corporations are 
permissible, and concludes that at least some jurisdictions are al-
most certain to continue allowing such suits. Part II turns to the 
question of transnational corporate defendants, considering sev-
eral possible ways to define foreign corporations and concluding 
that a functional standard is best suited to accomplish the ATS’s 
purposes as defined by Jesner. 
Part III proposes a legal standard I call the Functional For-
eignness Test, which determines if a corporation is foreign by ask-
ing whether the United States’ ties to the corporation are at least 
as strong as the corporation’s ties to any other nation. This test 
takes a holistic view of factors such as the nationality of corporate 
actors and shareholders, the location of corporate facilities, and 
the amount of business done in the United States. If this holistic 
picture suggests that the corporation is as closely tied to the 
 
 25 This is merely one example of a growing trend of frustrated attempts to hold trans-
national corporations responsible for their wrongdoing, especially with regard to human 
rights violations. As the world’s economy becomes more globalized, transnational corpora-
tions are increasingly prevalent and influential, and current legal frameworks are inade-
quate to keep these corporations in check. This backdrop of insufficient accountability 
mechanisms for transnational corporations frames this Comment. For further discussion 
of underregulated transnational corporations, see Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General 
Personal Jurisdiction over Transnational Corporations, 121 Penn St L Rev 617, 651–67 
(2017) (discussing the consequences of federal court decisions limiting personal jurisdic-
tion over transnational corporations, especially with regard to human rights abuses);  
Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights Law: Toward Global Regulation of 
Transnational Corporations, 88 Denver U L Rev 183, 190–203 (2010) (describing the 
weaknesses of current efforts to regulate the human rights violations of transnational cor-
porations); Regina E. Rauxloh, A Call for the End of Impunity for Multinational Corpora-
tions, 14 Tex Wesleyan L Rev 297, 303–13 (2008) (explaining the shortcomings of interna-
tional laws, national laws, and codes of conduct in addressing human rights violations of 
transnational corporations). 
 26 This Comment uses the term “nondomestic” to refer to corporations that are not 
incorporated in the United States, but which may or may not be “foreign” for ATS pur-
poses. When used to apply to corporations, the word “foreign” will always imply foreign-
ness for the purpose of the Jesner rule. 
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United States as any other nation, the corporation fails the test 
and should not be considered “foreign” for ATS purposes. In this 
way, courts can apply the Jesner rule so as to better further the 
ATS’s purpose of ensuring that US nationals will be held account-
able for their actions, without allowing US courts to meddle in 
other countries’ affairs. In addition, Part III discusses the way 
that courts ought to view the parent-subsidiary relationship. I ar-
gue that for purposes of the Functional Foreignness Test, distinc-
tions between parent companies and subsidiaries should be rele-
vant only to the extent that they reflect the reality of corporate 
activities. Otherwise, these sorts of legal fictions27 could render 
the ATS impotent. 
Next, Part III applies the Functional Foreignness Test to 
Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast. This demonstrates how the test 
could provide the jurisdiction necessary to hold transnational cor-
porations with strong ties to the United States responsible for se-
vere violations of universal norms of international law. Finally, it 
concludes by responding to a likely criticism of the Functional 
Foreignness Test: that it violates the separation of powers by 
making a policy decision properly left to Congress, especially 
given that it implicates foreign relations. 
In sum, this Comment argues that in spite of assumptions 
made by certain lower courts and litigants, the rule announced in 
Jesner need not be applied formalistically. A functional standard 
that assesses a corporation’s operative ties to the United States 
better serves the ATS’s purposes and addresses violations in a 
principled way. 
I.  HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
This Part briefly summarizes the history of the ATS. First, it 
provides an overview of the ATS’s promulgation, long history of 
disuse, and recent emergence as a tool to address international 
human rights violations, including the Supreme Court’s decisions 
 
 27 The idea that a corporate entity is a legal “person” entirely distinct from other 
individuals or corporations is often referred to as a “legal fiction,” meaning a legal con-
struct that does not truly reflect reality but is taken as true in applying the law. See  
Skupski v Western Navigation Corp, 123 F Supp 309, 311 (SDNY 1954) (referring to “the 
legal fiction of separate corporate entities”). This language of fiction derives largely from 
International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 (1945) (“[T]he corporate personality 
is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.”). 
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in Sosa and Kiobel. Then, it turns to the Jesner decision, summa-
rizing the Court’s reasoning for concluding that foreign corpora-
tions cannot be defendants in ATS suits. 
A. The ATS before Jesner 
The First Congress passed the ATS in 1789 as part of the Ju-
diciary Act, the original bill that established and organized the 
federal judiciary.28 From 1789 until 1980, only two cases relied on 
the ATS as a basis of jurisdiction, as noncitizens29 rarely brought 
tort suits in US federal courts.30 As a result, there is little case 
law from the ATS’s early days to shed light on its meaning. Fur-
ther obscuring efforts at interpretation, as the Court pointed out 
in Sosa, is the ATS’s “poverty of drafting history,” which has 
meant that “modern commentators have necessarily concentrated 
on the text” and “a consensus understanding of what Congress 
intended has proven elusive.”31 Scholars have put forth various 
 
 28 See Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the 
First Congress and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 
Pepperdine L Rev 847, 861–62 (2010) (describing the purpose of the Judiciary Act and the 
First Congress’s intent not to vest federal courts with the full extent of jurisdiction per-
mitted by Article III of the Constitution). 
 29 Even the precise meaning of the term “alien,” as used in the statute, is not entirely 
clear. Some have argued that the term only includes noncitizen residents of the United 
States, though this interpretation has failed to gain support in courts. Compare M.  
Anderson Berry, Whether Foreigner or Alien: A New Look at the Original Language of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 27 Berkeley J Intl L 316, 381 (2009) (arguing that “aliens” must reside 
in the United States for ATS purposes), with Lizarbe v Rondon, 642 F Supp 2d 473, 492 
(D Md 2009) (rejecting this interpretation and concluding that the Supreme Court dis-
posed of this issue in Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466, 468 (2004), which stated, “the courts of 
the United States have traditionally been open to nonresident aliens . . . . And indeed, [the 
ATS] explicitly confers the privilege of suing . . . on aliens alone.”) (citations omitted). In-
stead, courts appear to implicitly accept the term “alien” to include any noncitizen regard-
less of residence. See, for example, Kiobel, 569 US at 113 (failing to discuss whether the 
plaintiffs, former Nigerian residents turned legal permanent residents in the US, qualify 
as “aliens,” despite a thorough argument against their “alien” status, in Supplemental 
Brief of KBR, Inc, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co, No 10-1491, *16–21 (US filed Aug 8, 2012)); Sarei v Rio Tinto, 671 F3d 736 
(9th Cir 2011) (permitting an ATS claim by residents of Papua New Guinea without ad-
dressing the question of whether they qualify as “aliens”). 
 30 See Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v Clift, 195 F Supp 857, 865 (D Md 1961) (relying 
on the ATS for jurisdiction in a child custody case); Bolchos v Darrel, 3 F Cases 810, 810 
(DSC 1795) (referring to the ATS as an alternative ground of jurisdiction in a case involv-
ing a dispute over the ownership of slaves). See also Developments in the Law: Extraterri-
toriality, 124 Harv L Rev 1226, 1235 (2011); Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 458 (cited 
in note 10). 
 31 Sosa, 542 US at 718–19. 
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historical arguments for differing interpretations of the ATS.32 
Theories of congressional intent include goals such as protecting 
foreign diplomats, establishing jurisdiction over prize cases aris-
ing from wartime captures of merchant vessels, addressing viola-
tions of “safe-conducts or passports” in cases when foreigners 
were under the protection of the state, enabling the United States 
to take responsibility for certain violations of international law, 
or providing universal jurisdiction over a class of particular 
breaches of the law of nations.33 
The use of the ATS changed dramatically in 1980, when liti-
gants began to explore the possibility of using the statute as a tool 
for enforcing international human rights law. This transition was 
marked by the landmark case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala,34 in which 
the Second Circuit used the ATS to establish jurisdiction over a 
case in which Paraguayan citizens sued another Paraguayan cit-
izen for causing their son’s death through torture.35 Filartiga was 
the first case in which noncitizens used the ATS to sue other 
noncitizens for events that occurred outside US territory.36 Fol-
lowing Filartiga, a circuit split arose regarding the use of the ATS 
for cases in which neither the parties nor the conduct at issue 
were tied to the United States.37 
 
 32 Kedar S. Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the 
Alien Tort Statute, 27 Emory Intl L Rev 447, 453 (2013) (“The intent of the First Congress 
remains unclear despite the attention of judges and legal scholars.”). 
 33 Jennifer K. Elsea, The Alien Tort Statute: Legislative History and Executive 
Branch Views *8–11 (Congressional Research Service, Oct 2, 2003), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7YF4-QK3L; Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 465 (cited in note 10) 
(arguing that the ATS was designed to ensure that the United States could redress harms 
caused to foreigners by US citizens, in order to avoid reprisals by other nations); Thomas 
H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum L Rev 830, 879–82 
(2006) (arguing that the ATS was exclusively designed to target violations of “safe  
conducts”). 
 34 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980). 
 35 Id at 878, 887. 
 36 Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 459–60 (cited in note 10). 
 37 Compare Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F3d 844, 847–48 (11th Cir 1996) (affirming a 
judgment against a former Ethiopian government official for torture and other cruel acts 
against former Ethiopian prisoners); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights 
Litigation, 25 F3d 1467, 1475–76 (9th Cir 1994) (affirming a judgment against a former 
president of the Philippines for acts of torture, summary execution, and disappearance of 
Philippine citizens), with Tel-Oren v Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F2d 774 (DC Cir 1984) 
(per curiam) (dismissing a claim by Israeli citizens against a Palestinian organization al-
legedly involved in an armed attack abroad, with two of three concurring judges rejecting 
Filartiga). 
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Scholars also disputed whether Filartiga’s interpretation of 
the ATS was appropriate.38 Some applauded the decision’s will-
ingness to take a more expansive view of international human 
rights law and the role of US courts in applying it. In one of the 
first articles providing a comprehensive analysis of the case, Pro-
fessors Jeffrey Blum and Ralph Steinhardt concluded by calling 
it a “victory for human rights activists” and emphasizing the pos-
itive impact it could have both domestically and internationally.39 
They described Filartiga as a commendable shift toward accept-
ing the legitimacy of international custom and away from the di-
chotomy between binding and nonbinding treaties.40 Similarly, 
Professor Jack Garvey offered an endorsement of the “interna-
tional tort” model for addressing international human rights vio-
lations, praising its ability to redress such injuries in a manner 
that avoids “parochialism” by relying on substantive interna-
tional law.41 Elsewhere, the Filartiga court was called “a court ed-
ucated in modern international law, which recognized its consti-
tutional authority and responsibility to apply that law in 
appropriate cases.”42 These positive reactions sometimes echoed 
and drew legitimacy from a brief submitted by the Department of 
Justice in the case, which stated that “a refusal to recognize a 
private cause of action in these circumstances might seriously 
damage the credibility of our nation’s commitment to the protec-
tion of human rights.”43 
By contrast, others condemned Filartiga as inappropriately 
expanding the United States’ role in policing human rights viola-
tions abroad, especially given that the decision came from the 
 
 38 For a summary of favorable and unfavorable reactions to Filartiga, see Karen E. 
Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala after Ten Years: Major Breakthrough or Legal Oddity?, 20 Ga 
J Intl & Comp L 543, 546–54 (1990). See also Bellia and Clark, 78 U Chi L Rev at 460–61 
(cited in note 10) (summarizing conflicting responses to Filartiga and collecting sources). 
 39 Jeffrey M. Blum and Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International 
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 Harv 
Intl L J 53, 112–13 (1981).  
 40 Id at 74. 
 41 Jack I. Garvey, Repression of the Political Émigré—The Underground to Interna-
tional Law: A Proposal for Remedy, 90 Yale L J 78, 119 (1980). 
 42 Kathryn Burke, et al, Application of International Human Rights Law in State 
and Federal Courts, 18 Tex Intl L J 291, 321 (1983). 
 43 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Filartiga v Pena-Irala, 
No 79-6090, *22–23 (2d Cir filed June 6, 1980) (available on Westlaw at 1980 WL 340146). 
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courts rather than the political branches.44 One commentator crit-
icized the decision as “miss[ing] the point” of international human 
rights law, which should be “making the home government an-
swerable before domestic legal tribunals,” rather than “prose-
cut[ing] a foreign state” from afar.45 One article, though offering 
a generally favorable view of Filartiga, nonetheless noted that it 
was “bound to evoke resentment abroad as an act of moral impe-
rialism.”46 Others raised concerns that the ruling would discour-
age commerce with the United States, or do “more harm  
than good” by providing an illusory remedy that would likely be  
unenforceable.47 
In 2004, the Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for the first 
time in Sosa v Alvarez-Machain. In Sosa, the Court concluded 
that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of 
action.”48 However, it clarified that this interpretation did not in-
dicate that the ATS, when passed, was merely “a jurisdictional 
convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future Con-
gress.”49 The Court reasoned instead that Congress designed the 
ATS to be immediately applicable only in cases involving a nar-
row class of torts that violated international law and were recog-
nized at common law at the time of the ATS’s enactment.50 This 
is not to say that the possible causes of action would be forever 
limited to those that existed in 1789. Rather, the Court merely 
established that the ATS was immediately operative and could 
serve as a basis for jurisdiction, in conjunction with the common 
law, without requiring an additional statute creating a cause of 
action.51 
Courts have distilled Sosa’s reasoning into a two-part test to 
determine whether a given cause of action exists under the ATS. 
First, courts must answer a “threshold question whether a plain-
tiff can demonstrate that the alleged violation is of a norm that is 
 
 44 See, for example, Mark P. Jacobsen, Case Note, 28 U.S.C. 1350: A Legal Remedy 
for Torture in Paraguay?, 69 Georgetown L J 833, 846 (1981) (“[T]he effect of the decision 
was to intrude upon the foreign affairs powers of the President and the Senate.”). 
 45 Farooq Hassan, A Conflict of Philosophies: The Filartiga Jurisprudence, 32 Intl & 
Comp L Q 250, 257–58 (1983). 
 46 C. Donald Johnson Jr, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: A Contribution to the Development 
of Customary International Law by a Domestic Court, 11 Ga J Intl & Comp L 335,  
340 (1981).  
 47 Holt, 20 Ga J Intl & Comp L at 552–53 (cited in note 38). 
 48 Sosa, 542 US at 724. 
 49 Id at 719. 
 50 Id at 714, 720. 
 51 Id at 724. 
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specific, universal, and obligatory.”52 Next, the court must decide 
“whether allowing this case to proceed under the ATS is a proper 
exercise of judicial discretion, or instead whether caution requires 
the political branches to grant specific authority before [ ] liability 
can be imposed.”53 With this reasoning in Sosa, emphasizing judi-
cial restraint and deference to the political branches, the Court 
suggested a more cautious application of the ATS than lower 
courts had been applying in cases such as Filartiga. 
Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court took this restraint 
a step further by adding a territorial requirement to ATS suits.54 
Nigerian residents of an area called Ogoniland had brought suit 
against British, Dutch, and Nigerian corporations.55 According to 
the complaint, when plaintiffs protested environmental damage 
caused by defendants’ activities in Ogoniland, defendants “en-
listed the Nigerian Government to violently suppress the bur-
geoning demonstrations,” which led to military and police forces 
“beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying 
or looting property,” allegedly with various forms of aid from de-
fendant corporations.56 In Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, the 
Court held that ATS suits cannot be sustained when “all the rel-
evant conduct took place outside the United States.”57 Notably, 
the Court did not preclude all cases regarding extraterritorial 
conduct, but merely determined that a presumption against ex-
traterritoriality applies to the ATS, such that in cases that “touch 
and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so 
with sufficient force to displace” that presumption.58  So while  
Kiobel certainly ended ATS litigation for cases such as Filartiga, 
it still left open questions regarding the precise contours of ATS 
jurisdiction. 
Following Sosa and Kiobel, the Supreme Court had substan-
tially curtailed the use of the ATS as an international human 
rights tool, disappointing those who saw Filartiga as ushering  
in a new era of universal jurisdiction over international law  
violations. However, the Court had not entirely precluded ATS 
 
 52 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1399 (Kennedy) (plurality) (quotation marks omitted). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Kiobel, 569 US at 124 (“We therefore conclude that the presumption against ex-
traterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts 
that presumption.”). 
 55 Id at 111–12. 
 56 Id at 113. 
 57 Id at 124. 
 58 Kiobel, 569 US at 124–25. 
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jurisdiction over cases involving conduct abroad, nor cases involv-
ing foreign defendants. These issues would come to the fore once 
more in Jesner. 
B. Jesner v Arab Bank 
In June 2018, the Court made its third and most recent ruling 
on the ATS in Jesner v Arab Bank. Jesner involved a class action 
suit in which roughly six thousand plaintiffs59 sued Arab Bank, a 
major Jordanian corporation.60 The plaintiffs alleged that some of 
its officials “allowed the Bank to be used to transfer funds to ter-
rorist groups in the Middle East, which in turn enabled or facili-
tated criminal acts of terrorism.”61 In an attempt to satisfy the 
requirement set in Kiobel, plaintiffs also alleged that Arab Bank 
used a branch in New York—its single branch in the United 
States—to “clear dollar-denominated transactions through the 
Clearing House Interbank Payments System.”62 To put this alle-
gation more simply, plaintiffs claimed that an automated pro-
cessing system in Arab Bank’s New York branch, which processes 
about 440,000 transactions each day, was involved in the trans-
actions that benefited terrorist groups outside the United 
States.63 Unsurprisingly, the Court noted the tenuous connection 
to US territory.64 However, the Court did not dismiss the case for 
failure to displace the Kiobel presumption against extraterritori-
ality. Instead, it issued a blanket holding that foreign corpora-
tions cannot be defendants in ATS suits.65 
The Court’s categorical denial of jurisdiction was based on 
two interrelated arguments. First, the ATS’s purpose is to hold 
US actors accountable for injuries to foreign nationals in order to 
 
 59 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Jesner v Arab Bank, No 16-499, *ii (US filed Oct 
5, 2016) (Jesner Cert Petition).  
 60 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1393.  
 61 Id. 
 62 Id at 1394. 
 63 Id at 1395. 
 64 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1406 (“[T]he relatively minor connection between the terrorist 
attacks at issue in this case and the alleged conduct in the United States well illustrates 
the perils of extending the scope of ATS liability to foreign multinational corporations like 
Arab Bank.”). 
 65 Id at 1407. Parts of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion in Jesner were for a plu-
rality of three justices; there were also three concurrences and a dissent. This Comment 
focuses on the holding and the reasoning of the parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that 
obtained a majority. 
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reduce diplomatic friction,66 and the ATS should therefore not en-
able cases likely to cause such friction.67 For example, the Court 
noted that the Jesner litigation had been going on for thirteen 
years, during which it “caused significant diplomatic tensions 
with Jordan, a critical ally . . . [that] considers the instant litiga-
tion to be a grave affront to its sovereignty.”68 Second, cases such 
as these, which implicate sensitive issues of international rela-
tions, are best left to Congress.69 
Regarding Congress’s purpose in enacting the ATS, a subject 
that has frequently been a topic of dispute among courts and legal 
scholars,70 Jesner gives a concise formulation: “The principal ob-
jective of the statute, when first enacted, was to avoid foreign en-
tanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal forum where 
the failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the 
United States responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.”71 In 
other words, the ATS aims to hold US actors responsible for inju-
ries to foreign citizens in order to avoid diplomatic problems with 
other countries. Given this guiding objective, the Court noted that 
expansive ATS jurisdiction of the Filartiga variety had drawn 
criticism from abroad, indicating that such suits undermine the 
ATS’s goal by causing diplomatic tensions rather than alleviating 
them.72 Indeed, previous ATS suits have caused diplomatic strife. 
 
 66 Id at 1397 (explaining that “[t]he principal objective of the [ATS], when first en-
acted, was to avoid foreign entanglements”). 
 67 Id at 1406. 
 68 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1406–07. 
 69 Id at 1402–03. It is common for courts and scholars to make similar arguments 
suggesting that the judiciary should avoid interfering with foreign relations or offending 
foreign sovereigns. See, for example, Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing 
Foreign Relations Law, 116 Yale L J 1170, 1177 (2007): 
Courts are alert to the risks of creating international tensions, and in many 
cases they seem to be making a presumptive judgment that deferring to the in-
terests of foreign sovereigns produces benefits for Americans that outweigh the 
costs. . . . [C]ourts should play a smaller role than they currently do in interpret-
ing statutes that touch on foreign relations. 
See also Sosa, 542 US at 727–28. 
 70 See, for example, Mirela V. Hristova, The Alien Tort Statute: A Vehicle for Imple-
menting the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights and Pro-
moting Corporate Social Responsibility, 47 USF L Rev 89, 95 (2012) (“[T]here is no record 
of legislative debate on [the ATS’s] purpose and ‘consensus of what Congress intended has 
proven elusive.’”), quoting Sosa, 542 US at 718–19. 
 71 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397. 
 72 Id at 1398. Scholars have raised similar concerns regarding diplomatic conse-
quences of ATS suits. See, for example, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas K. Mitrokostas, 
International Implications of the Alien Tort Statute, 16 St Thomas L Rev 607, 613 (2004) 
(“ATS decisions following Filartiga, . . . may seriously damage United States relations 
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For instance, Chinese citizens brought a series of ATS suits in 
response to the Chinese government’s crackdown against the  
Falun Gong spiritual movement in 1999.73 The Chinese govern-
ment denounced the lawsuits, complained to US officials, and 
suggested the suits would cause “immeasurable interferences” 
with diplomatic relations.74 
In addition to its concern regarding diplomatic friction, the 
Jesner Court cited its “general reluctance to extend judicially cre-
ated private rights of action” as a reason for dismissing the suit.75 
The Court described various recent cases in which the Court re-
frained from establishing rights of action.76 It reasoned that “the 
Legislature is in the better position to consider if the public inter-
est would be served by imposing a new substantive legal liability” 
and, therefore, “if there are sound reasons to think Congress 
might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy, . . . 
courts must refrain from creating the remedy in order to respect 
the role of Congress.”77 The Court noted that this rule of deference 
has been applied to reject the expansion of an already-existing 
cause of action—specifically, liability under Bivens—to corporate 
defendants.78 Adding that such concerns apply with special weight 
in cases that implicate foreign relations, the Court concluded that 
“absent further action from Congress it would be inappropriate 
for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations.”79 
By precluding ATS suits against foreign corporations, Jesner 
struck another blow to advocates who seek to use the ATS as a 
tool for combatting human rights violations abroad. In addition 
to the thousands of Jesner plaintiffs who failed to obtain any relief 
and the Nestlé litigants who are no longer pursuing claims 
against Nestlé SA or Nestlé Ivory Coast, other plaintiffs have also 
 
with foreign states, obstruct Executive policymaking, and reverse the effects of interna-
tional trade and investment liberalization.”). 
 73 Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 Wash U L Rev 
1117, 1152–53 (2011). 
 74 Id at 1153, quoting Doe v Qi, 349 F Supp 2d 1258, 1300 (ND Cal 2004). However, 
Professor Robert Knowles notes that there is no evidence that the suits actually affected 
Chinese policy or sentiment toward the United States. Knowles, 88 Wash U L Rev at 1154 
(cited in note 73). 
 75 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1402. 
 76 Id at 1402, citing Sosa, 542 US at 727. 
 77 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1402. 
 78 Id at 1403. Bivens actions were established by Bivens v Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388 (1971). In Bivens, the Court created a 
private cause of action for a narrow set of claims regarding constitutional rights violations 
by individual government agents. Id at 395–97.  
 79 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1403. 
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dropped defendants from suits following Jesner.80 Moreover, in-
ternational human rights violations by corporations across the 
world are widespread and notoriously difficult to punish.81 For  
instance, in its 2018 report, the Corporate Human Rights  
Benchmark found that of 101 of the world’s largest companies in  
human-rights-risk sectors,82 48 had been the subject of serious  
allegations of human rights violations between January 2015 and 
December 2017.83 These allegations concerned violations such as 
forced labor, child labor, and infringements on rights to land, live-
lihood, and water.84 The report found that in a majority of cases, 
companies failed to take any appropriate action in response.85  
The ATS might have helped to fill this accountability gap, but  
Jesner limits the statute’s reach with respect to many corporate  
defendants. 
Jesner also left a number of important questions unresolved. 
Most strikingly, it did not answer the question whether corpora-
tions in general may be named as ATS defendants. Though the 
petition for a writ of certiorari presented the single question of 
“[w]hether the Alien Tort Statute categorically forecloses corpo-
rate liability,”86 and the Court discussed a number of lower court 
decisions ruling for or against corporate liability, 87  the Court 
 
 80 See, for example, Kaplan v Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F3d 
501, 515 (DC Cir 2018) (relying on Jesner to dismiss another case alleging funding of ter-
rorist activities by a foreign bank).  
 81 For sources discussing inadequate accountability mechanisms for transnational 
corporations, see note 25. 
 82 The report considers companies in the agricultural, apparel, and extractive  
industries. 
 83 Corporate Human Rights Benchmark, 2018 Key Findings: Apparel, Agricultural 
Products and Extractives Companies *44 (2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3UL2-3Q6G 
(CHRB Report). 
 84 Id at *45. 
 85 Id at *46. The report measures “appropriate action” by considering whether com-
panies “engaged in dialogue with the allegedly impacted stakeholders,” “[took] appropriate 
actions to address the alleged impact,” or “demonstrate[d] improvements in the related 
management systems to reduce such impacts in the future.” Id. When allegations were 
denied, the report considered whether companies “show[ed] [ ] participation in engage-
ment efforts” or “disclose[d] reviews of related management systems.” None of these ac-
tions were taken in 57 percent of allegations. Id. 
 86 Jesner Cert Petition at *i (citation omitted) (cited in note 59). 
 87 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1395–96 (discussing the Second Circuit’s determination that 
the ATS does not extend to suits against corporations, but noting that the Seventh, Ninth, 
and DC Circuits had all disagreed), citing Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 631 F3d 
111, 120 (2d Cir 2010); Flomo v Firestone Natural Rubber Co, 643 F3d 1013, 1017–21 (7th 
Cir 2011); Nestle I, 766 F3d at 1020–22; Doe VIII v Exxon Mobil Corp, 654 F3d 11, 40–55 
(DC Cir 2011) (Exxon Mobil). 
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nonetheless limited its holding to foreign corporations. Addition-
ally, as this Comment argues, the Court left open the question of 
what, precisely, makes a corporation “foreign” for ATS purposes. 
C. Corporate Defendants in ATS Suits after Jesner 
This Comment does not focus on whether ATS suits against 
corporations are permissible in the first place, as this question 
has been extensively debated elsewhere.88 Instead, it addresses 
when, if corporations are indeed permissible ATS defendants, 
transnational corporations that are neither wholly domestic nor 
wholly foreign may be defendants in ATS suits. However, because 
corporations must generally be permissible defendants for this ar-
gument to have any relevance, this Comment briefly discusses 
why ATS suits against corporations are likely to survive after  
Jesner, at least for domestic corporations. 
The question whether corporations can be ATS defendants is 
really two inquiries: whether there is corporate liability for the 
causes of action that give rise to ATS suits, and whether the ATS 
extends jurisdiction over cases involving corporate defendants. 
Before Jesner, courts focused on the first inquiry and viewed it as 
either a procedural question or a question of substantive interna-
tional law. According to the former view, the ATS provides subject 
matter jurisdiction and international law provides the cause of 
action, but the court is free to allow or reject corporate liability 
according to its own procedures.89 According to the latter view, the 
ATS provides the subject matter jurisdiction over particular 
causes of action established by international law,90 and corporate 
liability depends on whether there is an international law norm 
of corporate liability for that cause of action.91  
 
 88 See, for example, Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability under the 
Alien Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 Va J Intl L 353, 364–77 
(2011) (summarizing the history of corporate ATS liability jurisprudence and scholarship); 
Dustin Cooper, Comment, Aliens among Us: Factors to Determine Whether Corporations 
Should Face Prosecution in U.S. Courts for Their Actions Overseas, 77 La L Rev 513,  
522 (2016).  
 89 See, for example, Exxon Mobil, 654 F3d at 41–42 (allowing corporate liability be-
cause corporate liability is a procedural rather than substantive question).  
 90 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1399 (Kennedy) (plurality) (restating rule that ATS provides 
jurisdiction over suits arising from specific, universal, and obligatory norms of interna-
tional law). 
 91 See, for example, Flomo, 643 F3d at 1017–21 (allowing corporate liability because 
it is a norm of international law); Kiobel, 621 F3d at 120 (concluding that there is no in-
ternational norm of corporate liability, and therefore precluding corporate ATS liability).  
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Jesner, however, addressed the second inquiry: whether the 
ATS extends jurisdiction to cases involving corporate defendants. 
The Jesner Court precluded a class of defendants by reference to 
the ATS’s specific purpose,92 meaning that it found a jurisdic-
tional limitation inherent in the statute.93 This inherent jurisdic-
tional limit could potentially extend to all cases involving corpo-
rate defendants. 94  In this manner, Jesner adds an additional 
condition for suits against corporations to succeed: the statute 
must provide jurisdiction over such suits and corporate liability 
must be permissible for the particular cause of action according 
to either the court’s procedure or international law norms, de-
pending on which side of the pre-Jesner debate is taken. This Sec-
tion considers generally whether a corporation can be named as a 
defendant in an ATS suit. This includes both the jurisdictional 
question raised by Jesner and the corporate liability question that 
has long been subject to debate. 
Before Jesner, most circuits that ruled on the question of cor-
porate ATS liability concluded that corporate liability is permit-
ted. The Eleventh Circuit was the first to explicitly state this rule 
in Romero v Drummond Co.95 The Seventh, Ninth, and DC Cir-
cuits followed, with only the Second Circuit ruling against such 
liability.96 In resolving the issue of corporate liability under the 
ATS, courts took one of the two approaches described above. Some 
courts viewed the question of corporate liability as a procedural 
question separate from international law, and therefore simply 
applied their own procedures regarding corporate liability for the 
type of tort at issue. Other courts looked to international law, 
which must be violated in an ATS suit, and considered whether 
corporate liability exists under international law for the given 
cause of action. The Second Circuit took the latter approach.97 It 
 
 92 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1403. 
 93 Sosa, 542 US at 724 (explaining that “the ATS is solely jurisdictional”). 
 94 At least one court has interpreted Jesner as precluding corporate ATS liability 
entirely. See Freeman v HSBC Holdings PLC, 2018 WL 3616845, *18 n 35 (EDNY).  
 95 552 F3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir 2008). 
 96 Compare Flomo, 643 F3d at 1017–21 (concluding that corporate liability is a norm 
of international law and is therefore appropriate for ATS purposes); Sarei, 671 F3d at 765 
(“We . . . conclude that international law extends the scope of liability for war crimes to all 
actors, including corporations.”); Exxon Mobil, 654 F3d at 41–42 (allowing corporate lia-
bility because corporate liability is a procedural rather than substantive question, such 
that it is unsound to ask whether such liability is a norm of international law), with Kiobel, 
621 F3d at 120 (concluding that there is no international norm of corporate liability, and 
therefore precluding corporate ATS liability). 
 97 See Kiobel, 621 F3d at 120. 
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argued that customary international law determines the scope of 
ATS liability, and concluded that no sufficiently “specific, univer-
sal, and obligatory” norm of corporate liability exists in interna-
tional law, invoking the high standard set by Sosa.98 
The Seventh, Ninth, and DC Circuits also approached corpo-
rate liability as an international law question, but reached the 
opposite conclusion. In Flomo v Firestone Natural Rubber Co,99 
for instance, the Seventh Circuit discussed the issue extensively 
and found that corporate liability is indeed a norm of customary 
international law.100 The Ninth Circuit took the same approach 
and reached the same conclusion.101 This argument draws strength 
from successful lawsuits brought after World War II, under the 
authority of international law, against corporations that assisted 
the Nazi regime.102 
The DC Circuit, meanwhile, approached the question as one 
of procedure. It reasoned that international law does not define 
the scope of liability, which is a question of remedy rather than of 
substantive prohibition.103 As the court put it, “[t]here is no right 
to sue under the law of nations,” and therefore it is unsound to 
ask whether there is a right to sue corporations under customary 
international law.104  
Scholars, too, have made arguments taking either or both of 
these approaches to support or reject corporate ATS liability.105 
While these different arguments for and against corporate liabil-
ity are distinct from Jesner’s jurisdictional ruling and the argu-
ment of this Comment, they help to illuminate the complex his-
tory and doctrine surrounding the question of permissible ATS 
defendants. 
 
 98 Id at 136, 141. 
 99 643 F3d 1013 (7th Cir 2011). 
 100 Id at 1017–21. 
 101 See Sarei, 671 F3d at 765 (“We . . . conclude that international law extends the 
scope of liability for war crimes to all actors, including corporations.”), vacd for reconsid-
eration under Kiobel by Rio Tinto PLC v Sarei, 569 US 945 (2013), all claims dismissed, 
722 F3d 1109 (9th Cir 2013). Though this decision was vacated and the complaint dis-
missed following Kiobel, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its conclusions regarding corporate 
ATS liability in Nestle I, 766 F3d at 1022. 
 102 Flomo, 643 F3d at 1017. 
 103 Exxon Mobil, 654 F3d at 41. 
 104 Id at 42. 
 105 See generally, for example, Daniel Prince, Corporate Liability for International 
Torts: Did the Second Circuit Misinterpret the Alien Tort Statute?, 8 Seton Hall Cir Rev  
43 (2011).  
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Although Jesner does not resolve the issue of corporate liabil-
ity under the ATS, it does contain language that appears skepti-
cal of whether the ATS extends jurisdiction to cases with corpo-
rate defendants. The Jesner Court emphasized deference to 
Congress in questions of international relations as well as judicial 
restraint in extending private causes of action. If this reasoning 
led to a blanket ban on corporate defendants, this would establish 
another inherent limitation of the ATS rather than follow the  
Second Circuit’s holding based on its interpretation of inter- 
national law. 
However, the goal of reducing diplomatic friction provides a 
compelling rationale to treat domestic corporations differently 
from foreign ones. Holding foreign corporations accountable for 
acts that harm non-US citizens meddles in foreign affairs and is 
therefore likely to cause diplomatic friction. Yet, at the same time, 
failing to hold corporations with ties to the United States respon-
sible for their actions against foreign nationals could have the 
same effect.106 As a result, the reading of Jesner most consistent 
with its interpretation of the ATS does not suggest that a narrow 
application of the ATS is always better. Rather, courts should as-
sess whether, by allowing a certain class of defendants, the court 
is holding the United States responsible for the actions of its na-
tionals or simply meddling in the affairs of other nations. 
Following Jesner, courts that have ruled on the question of 
suits against corporate ATS defendants have continued to permit 
them—at least against domestic corporations. The Ninth Circuit 
did so in the Nestlé litigation,107 and several district courts have 
done the same.108 The US District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia, for instance, reasoned that when a suit “involves for-
eign plaintiffs suing an American corporate defendant,” the case 
“fully aligns with the original goals of the ATS: to provide a  
 
 106 Throughout this Comment, I discuss the United States’ responsibility with regard 
to corporate activities. I do not mean to suggest that the US government itself is connected 
to these activities. Rather, I am referring to a government’s responsibility for the acts of 
its nationals—including the obligation to make reparations for torts or crimes committed 
by those nationals—which I argue ought to apply to corporations as well. 
 107 Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1124 (“Jesner did not eliminate all corporate liability under 
the ATS, and we therefore continue to follow Nestle I’s holding [permitting corporate lia-
bility] as applied to domestic corporations.”). 
 108 See Estate of Alvarez v Johns Hopkins University, 2019 WL 95572, *9 (D Md); Al 
Shimari v CACI Premier Technology, Inc, 320 F Supp 3d 781, 787 (ED Va 2018); Nahl v 
Jaoude, 354 F Supp 3d 489, 506 (SDNY 2018).  
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federal forum for tort suits by aliens against Americans for inter-
national law violations.”109 The court added, “because [the defend-
ant] is an American, rather than a foreign, corporation, there is 
no risk that holding [the defendant] liable would offend any for-
eign government.”110 Notably, other district courts have barred 
ATS suits against corporations following Jesner.111 However, it is 
clear that Jesner has not definitively resolved this debate, and 
that ATS suits against corporations will continue in some juris-
dictions, at least for domestic corporate defendants. 
Given that Jesner has not brought an end to ATS suits 
against corporations generally, lower courts that permit such 
suits must now draw a distinction between foreign corporations 
that are not amenable to suit and other corporations that are. 
This raises a novel question, which this Comment seeks to  
answer: For the purposes of the ATS, what counts as a foreign 
corporation? 
II.  ATS SUITS AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
In several cases—including in the Nestlé litigation—plain-
tiffs have dropped certain defendants from their complaints in re-
sponse to the Jesner holding without pausing to interpret it.112 
They appear to assume that whether a corporation is foreign for 
ATS purposes can be readily determined based on its place of in-
corporation. Yet it is not clear that such a formalistic rule need 
apply. The distinction between foreign and domestic corporations 
has not been significant in previous ATS suits, so there is no es-
tablished definition of “foreign corporation” for ATS purposes. 
Moreover, different sources of law suggest different possible defi-
nitions that could be applied.113 This Comment therefore chal-
lenges the assumption that “foreign corporation” must be defined 
 
 109 Al Shimari, 320 F Supp 3d at 787.  
 110 Id. 
 111 See Wildhaber v EFV, 2018 WL 3069264, *6 (SD Fl); Freeman v HSBC Holdings 
PLC, 2018 WL 3616845, *18 n 35 (EDNY); Nahl, 354 F Supp 3d at 497. 
 112 Doe Supplemental Brief at *1 (cited in note 24); Wildhaber, 2018 WL 3069264  
at *2.  
 113 For instance, a corporation’s citizenship for diversity purposes is determined by 
both its place of incorporation and its principal place of business. 28 USC § 1332. However, 
whether a corporation “resides” in a given place for the purpose of the general venue stat-
ute depends on whether it is subject to personal jurisdiction there, which is determined 
through a more flexible test. 28 USC § 1391(c). For the purpose of federal alienage diver-
sity jurisdiction, a corporation has the nationality of “the state under the laws of which 
the corporation is organized,” a formulation that follows international law. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank v Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure Ltd, 536 US 88, 91–92 (2002). Some of 
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formalistically for ATS purposes. I argue that a functional ap-
proach based on a holistic assessment of a corporation’s ties to the 
United States better advances the purposes of the ATS and is 
more aligned with Jesner’s reasoning. 
This Part proceeds in three sections. First, it outlines some of 
the existing safeguards that limit the scope of the ATS in order to 
give context to the Jesner rule and show that concerns about ex-
panding ATS liability are often overstated. With these safeguards 
in mind, I turn to whether the ATS is better served by a formal-
istic rule or a functional standard for the definition of foreign cor-
poration. Drawing on analogous areas of law, I argue that formal-
istic rules for determining corporate nationality are inappropriate 
for the ATS. Then, I draw on personal jurisdiction doctrine to 
show that a functional standard is more appropriate. Such a 
standard more accurately promotes the ATS’s urgent and sensi-
tive foreign relations goals. 
A. Existing Safeguards against Jurisdictional Overreach in 
ATS Suits 
A number of existing safeguards already prevent ATS suits 
from overreaching and meddling in foreign affairs. As a result, 
many of the goals underlying the Jesner rule against foreign cor-
porate defendants are largely addressed by other limitations on 
ATS suits. This Section provides a brief overview of those limita-
tions in order to show that an overly cautious interpretation of 
the Jesner rule is unnecessary. 
First, courts have interpreted the ATS to apply only to a lim-
ited set of violations of international law: the international norm 
giving rise to the suit must be “specific, universal, and obliga-
tory.”114 This sets a high bar, limiting ATS suits to cases such as 
genocide, war crimes, and torture.115 By contrast, ATS suits have 
not been permitted to address “crimes against humanity arising 
 
these rules, which could provide guidance for the application of Jesner, will be discussed 
in more detail in Parts II.B and II.C. 
 114 Kiobel, 569 US at 109.  
 115 See Sarei v Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F3d 736, 758, 763 (9th Cir 2011) (genocide, war 
crimes); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F3d 1467, 1475 
(9th Cir 1994) (torture).  
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from a food and medical blockade,”116 “systematic racial discrimi-
nation,”117 or violations of free speech,118 among others. As a re-
sult, no matter how far the United States extends ATS jurisdic-
tion with respect to permissible defendants, the ATS will still be 
limited to a small class of cases because it only applies to rare, 
egregious incidents. Additionally, the concern that the United 
States is overreaching must always be weighed against the high 
stakes on the other side: in any ATS suit, an extreme violation 
such as genocide or war crimes has allegedly occurred, and  
the perpetrators may escape liability if the ATS suit is not  
permitted.119 
Next, the Kiobel rule already precludes suits based on events 
that took place outside US territory, except when they “touch and 
concern” US territory with “sufficient force to displace” the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality. 120  So cases in which the 
United States might be accused of meddling in the affairs of other 
countries are already likely to be barred as ATS suits. For in-
stance, Jesner would likely have been dismissed under the Kiobel 
rule even if the Court had not chosen to create a new rule regard-
ing foreign corporations. The actual acts of terrorism at issue in 
Jesner occurred overseas, and the only connection to the United 
States was an extremely tenuous link based on automated pro-
cesses that technically occurred at the New York branch.121 
Another important safeguard against overzealous assertions 
of the US courts’ jurisdiction is forum non conveniens.122 Viola-
tions giving rise to ATS suits, especially those regarding conduct 
 
 116 Sarei, 671 F3d at 767. 
 117 Id at 768. 
 118 See Guinto v Marcos, 654 F Supp 276, 280 (SD Cal 1986). 
 119 As discussed below, ATS suits should be dismissed under forum non conveniens if 
a court closer to the location of the violations would be more appropriate. Furthermore, 
though some international and regional tribunals do address some violations of interna-
tional law, their capacity to hear cases and enforce judgments is severely limited. For in-
stance, some bodies only hear cases between states or that are referred by states, while 
others hear only a small number of cases per year. See Emilie Hafner-Burton, Making 
Human Rights a Reality 36–40 (Princeton 2013) (providing an overview of international 
and regional courts). For a discussion of limited enforcement, see generally Gwen P. 
Barnes, Note, The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: 
The Indictment of President Omar Al Bashir, 34 Fordham Intl L J 1584 (2011). Depending 
on these tribunals would fall far short of the ATS’s goal of ensuring an available forum. 
Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397.  
 120 Kiobel, 569 US at 124–25.  
 121 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1394. 
 122 Black’s Law Dictionary 770 (West 10th ed 2014): 
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outside the United States perpetrated by non-US actors, would 
often be better addressed by local courts in the affected commu-
nities. When such redress is possible, ATS suits ought to be dis-
missed under forum non conveniens.123 Forum non conveniens is 
the principle that even if jurisdiction exists, courts may decline to 
hear a case in favor of a more convenient forum.124  
In Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert,125 the Supreme Court listed vari-
ous factors relevant to a consideration of forum non conveniens.126 
These include factors relating to the “private interest of the liti-
gant,” such as the various practical problems and costs of litigat-
ing in a faraway place.127 They also include “[f]actors of public in-
terest,” including the consideration that “[i]n cases which touch 
the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding the trial 
in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the coun-
try.”128 This last consideration alone would likely end any ATS 
suit in which the underlying controversy could plausibly be dealt 
with by a country more closely tied to it. This is especially true 
given that issues as large as government-sponsored torture or 
genocide implicate entire communities, and these communities 
deserve to be close to the trials for those injuries if possible. 
Though there is some debate over whether forum non conveniens 
should apply to ATS suits,129 this Comment assumes that it is 
among the available tools courts can use to limit ATS overreach 
 
The doctrine that an appropriate forum—even though competent under the 
law—may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the litigants and 
the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in 
which the action might also have been properly brought in the first place. 
 123 See Kiobel, 569 US at 139 (Breyer concurring) (proposing a jurisdictional approach 
to the ATS that relies on doctrines including forum non conveniens to limit the risk of 
overreach). See also Aric K. Short, Is the Alien Tort Statute Sacrosanct? Retaining Forum 
Non Conveniens in Human Rights Litigation, 33 NYU J Intl L & Polit 1001, 1053 (2001) 
(“[T]he doctrine of forum non conveniens provides a useful check on the possible overex-
tension of federal court subject matter jurisdiction in cases with few meaningful ties to the 
United States.”); Jonathan C. Drimmer and Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Lo-
cally: Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 Berkeley J Intl 
L 456, 471 (2011) (“[C]ourts often still dismiss ATS cases on forum non conveniens 
grounds.”). 
 124 See, for example, Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 507 (1947). 
 125 330 US 501 (1947). 
 126 Id at 508. 
 127 Id at 508–09. 
 128 Id at 509. 
 129 See generally Short, 33 NYU J Intl L & Polit 1001 (cited in note 123). 
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in appropriate cases, without resorting to blanket rules like the 
one pronounced in Jesner.130 
In Piper Aircraft Co v Reyno,131 the Supreme Court made it 
clear that a lack of available redress in the more convenient forum 
would only overcome forum non conveniens in extreme cases.132 
In Piper Aircraft, plaintiffs brought suit in a US district court re-
garding a plane crash that occurred in Scotland.133 Given various 
practical concerns that made Scotland a more convenient location 
for suit—including the fact that the relevant evidence was located 
in Scotland, and the petitioners would be unable to implead rele-
vant Scottish parties—the Court concluded that the district court 
was reasonable in dismissing the case under forum non conven-
iens.134 The Court acknowledged that Scottish law would be far 
less favorable to plaintiffs, but concluded that this “should ordi-
narily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the 
forum non conveniens inquiry.”135 But it later added that “if the 
remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate 
or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable 
change in law may be given substantial weight.”136 Forum non 
conveniens thereby likely precludes any ATS suit in which there 
is some remedy available in a more appropriate forum,137 restrict-
ing the number of cases amenable to ATS suits. The risk of US 
overreach is thereby limited to a small class of cases, and in these 
cases that risk must be weighed against a countervailing risk of 
allowing severe violations to go unaddressed. 
 
 130 See Jordan B. Redmon, Alien Torts in Foreign Courts: Responsible Restrictions on 
Extraterritorial Application of the Alien Tort Statute, 84 Miss L J 1329, 1356 (2015) (“The 
extensive development of forum non conveniens jurisprudence in the United States . . . 
makes for predictable and efficient resolution of choice-of-forum inquiries in the ATS  
context.”). 
 131 454 US 235 (1981). 
 132 Id at 254. 
 133 Id at 235. 
 134 Id at 237. 
 135 Piper Aircraft, 454 US at 247. 
 136 Id at 254 (emphasis added). 
 137 This may appear to suggest that forum non conveniens could mark the end of the 
most ATS litigation. However, it is often the case in ATS cases that no remedy is available 
abroad, as transnational corporations often commit abuses in the countries least-equipped 
to address those abuses. See Skinner, 121 Penn St L Rev at 659–60 (cited in note 25) 
(listing reasons that victims of human rights violations by transnational corporations are 
unlikely to obtain compensation, including corrupt judiciaries and lack of a legal basis to 
bring a claim). Nonetheless, it may be appropriate for courts to take a more permissive 
approach when applying forum non conveniens to ATS suits. See Drimmer and Lamoree, 
29 Berkeley J Intl L at 471 (cited in note 123) (“[M]ultiple surveys confirm that plaintiffs 
refile a very small percentage of cases abroad after dismissal from United States’ Courts.”). 
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Even if a suit touches and concerns the United States suffi-
ciently to satisfy Kiobel, and is brought by plaintiffs with no via-
ble source of redress in their own country, the suit still cannot 
survive unless the court establishes personal jurisdiction over de-
fendants. This means that any corporate defendant must either 
have affiliations with the forum state that are “so continuous and 
systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum,”138 
or purposefully conduct activity within the United States that is 
related to the subject matter of the suit.139 In ATS contexts, this 
severely limits the ability of US courts to meddle in foreign af-
fairs. Either a corporation is essentially “at home” in a US state, 
such that there is little practical difference between the corpora-
tion and a domestic corporation, or the underlying violation is di-
rectly connected to the corporation’s deliberate contacts with the 
United States, justifying the United States’ stake in redressing 
the violation. 
Given these safeguards, the only ATS suits that would sur-
vive without the Jesner rule would satisfy all of the following con-
ditions: they must be violations of universal norms; the defendant 
must have either strong, consistent ties to the United States or 
modest ties connected to the underlying conduct giving rise to the 
suit; the violations must touch and concern the United States suf-
ficiently to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality; 
and either the United States must be the most convenient forum 
or the most convenient forum must offer no possibility of redress. 
Therefore, a conservative interpretation of Jesner is unnecessary 
to avoid US overreach. ATS suits were already carefully limited 
before Jesner was decided. 
Indeed, with all these safeguards, it might seem dubious that 
the Jesner rule will matter in many cases. Even if a case is dis-
missed under Jesner, it may well have been dismissed under 
other rules in the absence of the Jesner rule. Yet although cases 
 
 138 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v Brown, 564 US 915, 919 (2011) (quota-
tion marks omitted). For an application of general personal jurisdiction in an ATS suit, 
see generally Daimler AG v Bauman, 571 US 117 (2014) (finding that California district 
court did not have personal jurisdiction over a nondomestic corporation that did not have 
sufficiently strong ties to California). 
 139 International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316–17 (1945). General jurisdic-
tion requires the defendant corporation to be at home in the forum state. See Daimler, 571 
US at 127. But when a corporate defendant is not subject to any district court’s jurisdic-
tion, and the claim arises under federal law, specific jurisdiction only requires sufficient 
contacts with the nation as a whole. See World Tanker Carriers Corp v MV Ya Mawlaya, 
99 F3d 717, 720 (5th Cir 1996).  
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that turn on the interpretation of Jesner may be rare, each of 
these cases will have high stakes. The example of the litigation 
against Nestlé shows how the interpretation of Jesner in a single 
case may determine whether a class of former child slaves will be 
able to hold culpable corporate actors responsible. In the Nestlé 
litigation, the alleged use of slavery was a sufficiently universal 
norm to satisfy Sosa;140 the relevant conduct of employees in the 
United States overcame the presumption against extraterritori-
ality, at least enough to survive a motion to dismiss;141 forum non 
conveniens was not raised, but likely would be defeated due to 
lack of redress for plaintiffs domestically, especially given the al-
leged role of government actors in the violations at issue;142 and 
personal jurisdiction is likely established through defendants’ in-
teractions with the United States, which are connected to the vi-
olations alleged.143 Despite all of this, and despite how different 
the case is from Jesner, Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast appear 
to have escaped the courts’ jurisdiction due to a formalistic appli-
cation of Jesner’s rule. In addition to striking cases like this, 
courts will likely use the Jesner rule more frequently in the fu-
ture. Corporations are becoming more global and complex, and 
neat distinctions between what is domestic and what is foreign 
are becoming increasingly blurred. Now is the time to clarify the 
scope of Jesner. 
B. Why a Formalistic Rule is Poorly Suited to the ATS 
With these considerations in mind, this Section turns to pos-
sible rules for determining whether a transnational corporation 
is foreign for purposes of the ATS. Though the term “transna-
tional corporation” has been defined in various ways, 144  this  
 
 140 See Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1124. For a discussion of the Sosa standard, see notes 52 
and 53 and accompanying text.  
 141 See Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1125–26.  
 142 Doe v Nestle, S.A., 748 F Supp 2d 1057, 1066 (CD Cal 2010).  
 143 First Amended Class Action Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, Doe v 
Nestle, S.A., No 205CV05133, *2 (CD Cal filed July 22, 2009) (available on Westlaw at 
2009 WL 2921081).  
 144 See, for example, Janet E. Kerr, A New Era of Responsibility: A Modern American 
Mandate for Corporate Social Responsibility, 78 UMKC L Rev 327, 332 n 24 (2009). Pro-
fessor Kerr defines a transnational corporation as “an enterprise which owns or has pro-
duction in a host-state outside the country in which it is based,” and cites various alterna-
tive definitions, such as “a cluster of corporations of diverse nationality joined together by 
ties of common ownership and responsive to a common management strategy.” Id, quoting 
Luzius Wildhaber, Some Aspects of the Transnational Corporation in International Law, 
27 Neth Intl L Rev 79, 80 (1980). 
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Comment uses it to refer to any corporation that is part of an en-
terprise with substantial operations in multiple countries.145 The 
obvious way to interpret Jesner for transnational corporations 
might simply follow a formalistic rule already used in other legal 
contexts. This Section will look at two such rules in turn: the 
place-of-incorporation rule applied at international law and the 
similar rule applied domestically to determine corporate citizen-
ship for diversity purposes. Due to key differences between these 
legal contexts and the ATS, this Section concludes that such for-
malistic rules are inappropriate for ATS suits and would under-
mine the goals espoused in Jesner. 
1. International law: the place-of-incorporation rule. 
In international law, a corporation’s nationality is deter-
mined by the state in which it was incorporated.146 As the Jesner 
rule does not derive from international law, but is instead an in-
terpretation of a domestic statute, there is no reason to assume it 
is adopting the international definition of “foreign corporation.” 
Further, this international law rule is not clearly incorporated 
into US law, although the Supreme Court did allude to it in 
JPMorgan Chase Bank v Traffic Stream (BVI) Infrastructure 
Ltd.147 In JPMorgan Chase, the plaintiff sought to sue under the 
federal alienage diversity statute, which grants district courts ju-
risdiction over civil actions regarding controversies “between cit-
izens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign State.”148 The 
defendant corporation argued that it was not a citizen of a foreign 
state because it was technically a citizen of the British Virgin Is-
lands, a territory of a foreign state (the United Kingdom) but not 
 
 145 In suits in US courts, defendants will presumably consist of discrete corporations 
rather than more broadly conceived “enterprises,” which often consist of many corpora-
tions. This definition therefore refers to the individual corporations rather than the larger 
enterprises they may be a part of (though of course a corporation that individually com-
prises a transnational enterprise is also included). However, in Part III.B, I argue that 
parent-subsidiary distinctions should be given limited weight when determining whether 
a corporation is foreign, such that the “foreignness” of the larger enterprise is ultimately 
the key issue in determining whether a corporation is a permissible ATS defendant. 
 146 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213, 
cmt c (1986). 
 147 536 US 88 (2002). For an early reference to this rule, see National Steamship Co 
v Tugman, 106 US 118, 121 (1882) (“[A] corporation [created by the laws of a foreign state] 
is, for purposes of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States, to be deemed, construc-
tively, a citizen or subject of such state.”). 
 148 28 USC § 1332(a)(2). 
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a state in its own right, an argument the Court ultimately re-
jected.149 During its analysis, the Court quoted the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 213, 
which states: “For purposes of international law, a corporation 
has the nationality of the state under the laws of which the cor-
poration is organized.”150 
This issue bears many similarities to the issue of defining for-
eign corporations for ATS purposes. In both cases, the statute at 
issue is a part of the US Code granting original jurisdiction to 
district courts, and in both cases the nationality of the defendant 
is relevant to whether that jurisdiction survives. Additionally, 
both statutes implicate international relations, such that inter-
national law is a natural place to look for a guiding rule. 
However, it is neither necessary nor sensible for courts to use 
this same state-of-incorporation rule to apply the Jesner rule to 
ATS cases. First, JPMorgan Chase’s use of the international law 
rule did not clearly incorporate it into domestic law. In JPMorgan 
Chase, the Court did not discuss the international place-of- 
incorporation rule or give a formal holding that it applies to US 
statutes. Instead, the court merely quoted the Restatement in a 
parenthetical following a “Cf.” citation.151 In addition, the rule is 
not central to the case, in which the disputed issue was whether 
the British Virgin Islands qualified as a “foreign state,” not  
the citizenship of defendant corporation. JPMorgan Chase is  
hardly a definitive endorsement of international law’s state-of- 
incorporation rule. 
Additionally, key differences between the federal alienage di-
versity statute and the ATS counsel against extending the inter-
national state-of-incorporation rule to the ATS context. First, the 
federal alienage diversity statute explicitly limits jurisdiction to 
cases in which defendants are “citizens or subjects of a foreign 
state,”152 whereas the ATS makes no mention of defendants’ citi-
zenship or nationality. Second, the federal alienage diversity stat-
ute makes no distinction between corporations and individuals, 
and the Court merely applied the rules of corporate citizenship in 
order to apply a rule that relates to individuals and corporations 
alike. 
 
 149 JPMorgan Chase, 536 US at 92. 
 150 Id at 91–92, quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 213 (1986). 
 151 See JPMorgan Chase, 536 US at 91–92. 
 152 28 USC § 1332(a)(3).  
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The Jesner Court, by contrast, did not interpret a statute that 
textually distinguishes defendants based on citizenship, but in-
stead established a novel rule distinguishing foreign corporations 
as a precluded group without making any blanket rule regarding 
all foreign defendants or all corporations. It is therefore clear that 
this rule does not arise from legal doctrine or textual interpreta-
tion, but is instead based on the practical issues raised by foreign 
corporations specifically. For that reason, the Jesner rule need not 
be applied according to the simplistic place-of-incorporation rule, 
and indeed would be better served by a functional rule that ad-
dresses those practical concerns. 
2. Domestic law: corporate citizenship for diversity cases. 
Another possible source of guidance is the rule used to deter-
mine corporate citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes. In 
that context, the citizenship of a corporation is determined based 
on its place of incorporation and its principal place of business,153 
and the Supreme Court has interpreted “principal place of busi-
ness” to mean the corporation’s “nerve center”—usually its head-
quarters.154 This statutory definition explicitly limits itself to the 
question of diversity jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court has left 
open the possibility that the citizenship of a corporation might be 
defined differently outside of the diversity context. Nonetheless, 
it is the most clearly established definition of corporate citizen-
ship in US law, and courts might naturally be inclined to turn to 
this definition in applying Jesner. 
The issues surrounding jurisdiction over corporations in di-
versity suits do bear some similarities to those underlying the is-
sue of jurisdiction under the ATS. In diversity suits, courts deter-
mine citizenship for the purpose of deciding whether federal 
jurisdiction is necessary to avoid unfair bias at the state level in 
cases in which citizens of a state sue noncitizens of that state.155 
The question is whether the corporation is at home and will not 
be at risk of mistreatment due to being an outsider. Similarly, the 
Court’s holding in Jesner suggests that Congress does not want 
to overreach by asserting jurisdiction over corporations that are 
not at home in the United States. In such cases, it will appear 
 
 153 28 USC § 1332(c)(1).  
 154 See Hertz Corp v Friend, 559 US 77, 92–93 (2010). 
 155 Hertz Corp, 559 US at 85. See also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? 
Historical Foundations and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes 
Involving Noncitizens, 21 Yale J Intl L 1, 18 (1996).  
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that the United States is interfering in another country’s eco-
nomic affairs, and the United States might be accused of doing so 
due to bias or economic motivations.156 
Still, the formalistic and bright-line rule for determining cit-
izenship of corporations for diversity purposes is not appropriate 
in ATS suits. In the case of diversity jurisdiction, the question is 
one of removal, not dismissal, such that a defendant will end up 
in court in the United States one way or another. If the defendant 
is not a citizen of the forum state, it may remove to federal 
court,157 but it may not escape the suit altogether. In other words, 
the option of federal court is assumed along with the option of 
suing in state court. As such, in diversity cases there is a smaller 
risk that injustice will go unaddressed, and courts therefore have 
little reason to hesitate in finding that a defendant may be sub-
jected to bias and would be better treated in federal court. Admit-
tedly, the right to invoke diversity jurisdiction hinges on bright-
line rules that could be gamed by corporations, which can choose 
where to incorporate and where to build their headquarters, and 
need not do so in the jurisdictions where they do the most busi-
ness or have the greatest impact. Nonetheless, courts need not 
fear such gamesmanship158 because no matter how corporations 
manipulate their “citizenship,” proving diversity can only lead to 
removal—not dismissal altogether. 
In ATS suits, however, the risk is high that no justice will be 
available if the defendant is labelled a foreign corporation. That 
label would preclude ATS liability after Jesner, potentially bar-
ring the suit from US jurisdiction—and ATS suits tend to involve 
cases in which redress is not available in plaintiffs’ home coun-
tries. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that ATS suits require 
particularly grave violations; allowing them to go unaddressed 
would be particularly harmful. At the same time, the fact that 
ATS suits are limited to such severe harms lessens the risk that 
 
 156 See Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1407 (“[T]his suit thus threatens to destabilize Jordan’s 
economy.”), quoting Brief for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Jesner v Arab Bank, PLC, No 16-499, *3 (US filed Aug 28, 2017). 
 157 28 USC § 1441(b). 
 158 In addition to explicitly gaming legal systems in order to obtain benefits, corpora-
tions are also likely to make decisions on the margins that take advantage of beneficial 
laws. For instance, corporations generally incorporate in Delaware because of its business-
friendly laws, even if this decision is not made for sinister reasons. Thus, when this Com-
ment talks about gamesmanship in the ATS context, it not only refers to deceptive corpo-
rate behaviors aimed at avoiding law, but also strategic decisions that take advantage of 
legal technicalities, even when these decisions are not deceptive or are also motivated by 
more legitimate goals. 
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the United States will overreach and subject corporations to un-
fair biases, as these situations are relatively rare. Moreover, a 
bright-line rule that invites gamesmanship undermines the pur-
pose of the ATS as stated in Jesner, which is to ensure an availa-
ble forum in appropriate cases.159 
Similarly, the high stakes and rarity of ATS suits suggest 
that the administrative costs of applying a flexible standard ra-
ther than a hard rule are unlikely to be significant.160 By contrast, 
the benefits of applying a more comprehensive and therefore ac-
curate standard are likely high, as preventing a single corpora-
tion from escaping liability through gamesmanship is significant 
in cases that involve violations such as genocide and war crimes, 
not only for the sake of justice, but also for accomplishing the 
ATS’s goal of ensuring that the United States holds its actors re-
sponsible for wrongful conduct against foreigners. 
In sum, compared to the question whether a defendant 
should be allowed to remove to federal court by invoking diversity 
jurisdiction, the question whether defendants should be permit-
ted to escape ATS liability altogether lends itself to a stronger 
presumption in favor of upholding jurisdiction. The risks are 
lower because the cases are limited, while the stakes are high be-
cause of the severe violations at issue. Further, courts should con-
sider the possible lack of redress for grave human rights abuses 
if ATS suits are not permitted, as well as corporations’ incentives 
to game the system in order to escape liability through  
technicalities. 
C. A Functional Standard Would Better Serve the ATS’s 
Purpose 
The preceding analysis of two possible formal rules for deter-
mining how to define foreign corporations for ATS purposes 
 
 159 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397. 
 160 There is a great deal of literature on the tradeoffs between rules and standards. 
The conventional understanding is that rules, such as a speed limit of 60 miles per hour, 
have the advantage of being cheap to apply (it is easy to tell if someone is driving over 60 
miles per hour), but the disadvantage of being less accurate because they are over- and 
underinclusive (under certain conditions, it might be safer to drive slower or faster than 
60 miles per hour). Standards, such as laws requiring drivers to “drive safely,” are costly 
to apply (How do you determine if someone is driving “safely”?), but more accurate because 
they can incorporate the facts of a situation (driving safely during a storm may require a 
different speed than driving safely to get someone to a hospital in an emergency). For an 
example of the discussion on rules and standards, see generally Isaac Ehrlich and Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J Legal Stud 257 (1974). 
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demonstrates why such rigid tests are inappropriate. Jesner cited 
practical motivations for its holding, but a state-of-incorporation 
or location-of-headquarters rule would poorly serve those consid-
erations. Instead, a formal rule would allow suits to proceed or 
fail on easily manipulated legal technicalities. These considera-
tions, which are common shortcomings of rules as compared to 
standards,161 suggest that a functional standard may be better 
than a formalistic rule for determining ATS jurisdiction over 
transnational corporations.162 
Personal jurisdiction over nondomestic corporations in fed-
eral courts provides guidance for what such a functional standard 
might look like. Though personal jurisdiction may seem some-
what removed from the question of how to define a foreign corpo-
ration, personal jurisdiction doctrine bears important similarities 
to the question of ATS jurisdiction. When courts find that they 
lack jurisdiction in either case, they dismiss the case; they do not 
simply allow removal to a different court as they do when they 
find diversity. As discussed above, this means that the stakes are 
higher and it is more important that courts get the answer right 
and prevent gamesmanship. 
In addition, both personal jurisdiction and ATS jurisdiction 
are limited by vital and sensitive constitutional goals. Personal 
jurisdiction is bounded by due process, a constitutional principle 
that cannot be restricted. Due process is also a complex issue that 
cannot be resolved by any simple bright-line rule.163 Jurisdiction 
under the ATS is limited by the separation of powers, as courts 
 
 161 See, for example, id at 268 (discussing the over- and underinclusiveness of rules). 
 162 On the other hand, there are oft-cited advantages of rules over standards, such as 
the ease of understanding and applying them. See id at 262–67. As will be discussed fur-
ther, however, the rarity and severity of ATS suits suggests that the relative ease of ap-
plying a rule is insignificant. It is easier to identify a defendant’s place of incorporation 
than to conduct a functional analysis of corporate activities, but such an analysis is still 
not very difficult. In occasional suits arising from extreme international law violations, it 
is not unreasonable to ask courts to do some basic research into a corporation’s business 
activity. 
 As for ease of understanding the rule, it is not necessary to provide corporations with 
absolute certainty as to whether they may be ATS defendants. If a corporation mistakenly 
fears it is subject to ATS suits and abstains from severe international law violations as a 
result, no harm is done. Conversely, a corporation is unlikely to be underdeterred in the 
ATS context, as any corporations incorporated in the United States will remain clearly 
subject to suit. Finally, it is not unfair to surprise corporations by holding them accounta-
ble for these severe violations, assuming jurisdiction is otherwise appropriate; they can 
hardly argue that they were unaware of international norms against genocide, slavery, or 
other such acts. 
 163 See, for example, Daimler, 571 US at 125. 
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must refrain from interfering in foreign affairs by overextending 
their jurisdiction.164 This goal is similarly urgent, and is also sim-
ilarly ill-suited to a bright-line rule: whether a given suit risks 
causing diplomatic friction by meddling in the affairs of other na-
tions is a complex question likely to turn on the facts of a given 
case. 
Whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a non-
domestic corporate defendant does not turn on a formalistic rule 
but instead looks to the reality of a corporation’s contacts with the 
jurisdiction.165  The governing standard for general jurisdiction 
over a defendant—that is, jurisdiction that covers all of the de-
fendant’s actions—is stated in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera-
tions, S.A. v Brown.166 In Goodyear, the Court explained that “[a] 
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign . . . corporations 
to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations 
with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them 
essentially at home in the forum state.”167 In other words, per-
sonal jurisdiction is established based on a holistic picture of a 
corporation’s ties to the forum. 
The governing standard for specific jurisdiction—jurisdiction 
based on a relationship between the forum and the specific un-
derlying controversy—derives from International Shoe Co v 
Washington. 168  In International Shoe, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that “in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in per-
sonam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, [due 
process requires that] he have certain minimum contacts with it 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.”169 As with general  
jurisdiction, then, specific jurisdiction looks to a holistic picture  
of a corporation’s relations with the forum. In J. McIntyre  
Machinery, Ltd v Nicastro,170 the Court elaborated on this rule, 
concluding that the “minimum contacts” required must arise from 
a defendant’s activity directed at the forum state, because such 
 
 164 See, for example, Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1398 (“ATS litigation implicates serious  
separation-of-powers and foreign relations concerns. Thus, ATS claims must be subject to 
vigilant doorkeeping.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 165 Id at 291. 
 166 564 US 915 (2011).  
 167 Id at 919 (quotation marks omitted).  
 168 326 US 310 (1945).  
 169 Id at 316 (quotation marks omitted).  
 170 564 US 873 (2011).  
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intentional activity constitutes a defendant’s submission to the 
state’s authority: 
Where a defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege 
of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking 
the benefits and protections of its laws, it submits to the ju-
dicial power of an otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent 
that power is exercised in connection with the defendant’s ac-
tivities touching on the State.171 
This provides a normative yardstick for measuring a corporation’s 
connections to the forum: if they amount to “purposeful avail-
ment” of that forum, jurisdiction over cases arising from that 
availment is justified. 
Personal jurisdiction, whether general or specific, thereby de-
pends on a corporation’s functional relationship with the forum. 
When judging that relationship, courts explicitly consider the 
normative goal of due process by asking whether a corporation’s 
contacts with the forum make jurisdiction fair. While determin-
ing personal jurisdiction is therefore more burdensome than ap-
plying a bright-line rule, it is also more accurate because courts 
make a flexible judgment based on the full facts of the case. As 
discussed previously, this makes sense because jurisdictional 
questions are often outcome determinative, due process is an es-
sential aim that should not be sacrificed to expediency or under-
mined by gamesmanship, and whether jurisdiction satisfies due 
process is a complicated question that cannot be easily reduced to 
a bright-line rule. 
ATS suits would similarly benefit from a standard that pri-
oritizes accuracy and flexibility over expediency. The stakes are 
high because dismissing a suit will likely mean that no redress is 
available to plaintiffs, the violations at issue are extreme, and the 
ATS serves the important goal of holding US actors accountable 
for their injuries to foreign nationals. At the same time, the com-
plexity of determining whether a given case would effectively 
serve this goal suggests that any bright-line rule would fail to ac-
curately distinguish between cases that would further the ATS’s 
purpose and those that would undermine it. And finally, the rel-
ative infrequency of ATS suits means that the added burden of a 
functional standard is unlikely to be significant. For all of these 
reasons, a functional standard that reflects the ATS’s goal—like 
 
 171 Id at 881 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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the functional standard used to determine personal jurisdiction—
is far better suited to the ATS than a formalistic rule. 
In addition to illustrating why a functional standard is ap-
propriate for the ATS, personal jurisdiction doctrine offers guid-
ance as to what such a standard might look like: courts should 
consider the nature of the corporation’s functional contacts with 
the United States in light of the ATS’s goal. In the case of personal 
jurisdiction, courts look at these contacts to determine whether 
jurisdiction is “fair,” as fairness is the goal of due process.172 In 
ATS suits, courts should look at these contacts to determine 
whether jurisdiction would further or inhibit the goal of holding 
US actors accountable for serious violations against foreign na-
tionals. That is, courts should look holistically at a corporation’s 
relationship with the United States, and exercise jurisdiction if it 
would further the ATS’s goal of holding US actors accountable but 
refrain from jurisdiction over any case that would hinder that 
goal by meddling in the affairs of other nations. 
III.  THE FUNCTIONAL FOREIGNNESS TEST 
A review of analogous areas of law has revealed that a func-
tional standard based on the ATS’s purpose is most appropriate 
for defining foreign corporations. Jesner states that the ATS’s 
purpose is to “ensur[e] the availability of a federal forum where 
the failure to provide one might cause another nation to hold the 
United States responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.”173 The 
definition of foreign corporation should therefore distinguish 
cases in which the United States has a genuine responsibility to 
hold a corporation responsible from those in which the United 
States would be policing corporations insufficiently connected to 
it. Guided by these considerations, I propose an inquiry into 
whether the United States’ ties to a corporation are at least as 
strong as any other nation’s. I call this standard the Functional 
Foreignness Test. A corporation that passes the Test proves that, 
in light of its relatively limited ties to the United States, it is in 
fact foreign. A corporation that fails the Test reveals that, though 
perhaps incorporated abroad, its functional ties to the United 
States show that it is not truly foreign. The United States has a 
responsibility to hold such a corporation accountable for its inju-
ries to foreign nationals. 
 
 172 International Shoe, 326 US at 316. 
 173 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397. 
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This formulation offers numerous advantages. As a broad 
standard rather than a formalistic rule, it prevents gamesman-
ship174 and reduces the likelihood that severe injuries subject to 
the ATS will go unaddressed. By focusing on US actors’ relative 
culpabilities, the Test hews closely to the guiding principle of  
Jesner, which is to prevent the United States from interfering 
with corporations with strong ties to another nation, while also 
preventing the United States from failing to take responsibility 
for injuries legitimately connected to it.175 The Test both avoids 
blame directed at the United States for ignoring serious human 
rights violations and respects international norms of limited in-
terference with the affairs of another nation’s corporations. The 
administrative burdens of a flexible standard instead of a rule are 
not high given the narrow set of cases in which ATS suits are pos-
sible, especially in light of other existing safeguards. And above 
all, by remaining flexible and goal-oriented, this standard does 
not sacrifice sensitive foreign relations issues to the expediency of 
a formalistic rule. 
To illustrate how the Functional Foreignness Test might be 
applied, this Part proceeds as follows: First, it identifies and ex-
plains a number of factors likely to be relevant to the Functional 
Foreignness Test. Then, it considers how the Functional Foreign-
ness Test ought to view the parent-subsidiary relationship, as 
this issue is likely to be dispositive in many ATS cases. Next, it 
applies the Functional Foreignness Test to the Nestlé litigation 
to show how it could be decisive in high-stakes suits. Finally, it 
concludes by responding to a likely criticism: that the Functional 
Foreignness Test would amount to judicial overreach, violating 
the separation of powers. 
A. Relevant Factors 
A number of factors are likely to be relevant in a holistic  
analysis of a corporation’s ties to the United States. These in-
clude: the place of incorporation; the location of corporate facili-
ties; the amount of business conducted in the United States; the 
financial relationship to the United States; and the nationality of 
board members, employees, and shareholders. These factors 
should not be considered in isolation, but rather should contribute 
to a holistic picture that reveals whether US courts ought to hold 
 
 174 See Part III.B.2. 
 175 See note 66 and accompanying text. 
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the corporation responsible for its wrongdoings. 176  Underlying 
each of these factors are two interwoven questions. First, is the 
United States contributing to the corporation’s activity such that 
it bears some responsibility for the corporation’s violations? And 
second, has the corporation chosen to take advantage of US re-
sources, such that US oversight is justified and less likely to be 
interpreted as meddling? 
If a corporation—including a subsidiary of another corpora-
tion—is incorporated in the United States, it will of course qualify 
as a domestic corporation for the purpose of ATS suits. Corpora-
tions not incorporated in the United States should be considered 
using the other factors to determine the extent of their contact 
with the United States. This avoids the potential technicality of 
allowing businesses to escape liability simply by filing chartering 
documents in another country while committing torts that touch 
and concern the United States. 
Additionally, the Functional Foreignness Test should look at 
how much corporate activity is conducted through facilities in the 
United States. Following Hertz Corp v Friend, 177  corporations 
should be considered nationals of the United States if their head-
quarters are located in the United States. Beyond that, other fa-
cilities such as factories, retail locations, or warehouses should 
also be taken into account. Such facilities indicate that the United 
States is providing a forum for the corporation’s activities, and 
also that the corporation is purposefully availing itself of US ter-
ritory, to use the language of J. McIntyre.178 
Similarly, when a corporation conducts a sufficient amount 
of business with the United States, the United States is impli-
cated in that corporation’s activity because it is supporting that 
corporation financially by providing access to the US market. At 
the same time, by availing themselves of the US market, trans-
national corporations arguably indicate “an intention to benefit 
 
 176 Similarly, the Test itself should not be considered in isolation from other ATS 
rules, especially the Kiobel rule requiring that cases touch and concern the United States. 
Both of these tests are driven by the same concern: avoiding United States overreach into 
affairs not sufficiently connected to it. Requiring that both the corporation and the viola-
tion at issue be closely tied to the United States is excessive and could prevent the United 
States from exercising oversight in cases closely connected with it. Instead, failing the 
Functional Foreignness Test should carry a presumption that the Kiobel rule has been 
satisfied as well. That is, courts should presume that the case touches and concerns the 
United States precisely because of its close tie to the alleged perpetrator. 
 177 559 US 77 (2010).  
 178 See J. McIntyre, 564 US at 881. 
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from and thus an intention to submit to the laws of” the United 
States.179 
If a transnational corporation relies heavily on financing 
from US banks or other US sources, the United States would im-
plicate itself in the corporation’s actions by financing and sup-
porting the corporation. Again, the corporation’s beneficial use of 
US finances would justify some US oversight. Conversely, when 
a corporation has stronger financial ties to another nation’s econ-
omy than to the United States’, as with Arab Bank, imposing lia-
bility would increase diplomatic friction180 and therefore tilt the 
balance toward a finding of foreignness. 
Finally, the Functional Foreignness Test should take into ac-
count the nationality of the various actors involved in the corpo-
ration. If many of those actors are US nationals, US actors are 
substantially responsible for the corporation’s acts. If the board of 
directors includes many US citizens, then US citizens are respon-
sible for overseeing the activities of the corporation. When many 
employees are US citizens, US citizens are carrying out the acts 
of the corporation. Finally, when US citizens make up a large por-
tion of the shareholders, US capital is effectively funding the cor-
poration and its activities, much like corporations financed by US 
banks. In each of these cases the corporation is receiving a sub-
stantial benefit from the United States, either through human 
capital or money, such that the United States can reasonably 
choose to impose costs in return for these benefits. 
B. The Parent-Subsidiary Distinction in the Functional 
Foreignness Test 
An important difficulty of the Functional Foreignness Test is 
how to treat parent-subsidiary relationships. This question is es-
sential and could easily be dispositive in most cases, which is why 
I give it extended treatment here. The United States’ ties to a 
transnational corporation will often be relegated to legally dis-
tinct US subsidiaries, and the international violations committed 
by transnational corporations will often be carried out by subsid-
iaries abroad. I argue that in applying the Test, courts should 
take a functional approach to differentiating the actions of parent 
corporations from their subsidiaries. 
 
 179 Id. 
 180 See note 67 and accompanying text. 
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1. The importance of a functional assessment of parent-
subsidiary relationships. 
The same aspects of ATS suits that justify the Functional 
Foreignness Test generally suggest that a functional approach 
should also be taken with respect to parent-subsidiary relation-
ships. Because the ATS furthers important and sensitive goals, 
its application should not turn on easily manipulated formalities. 
And once again, the high stakes and low frequency of ATS suits 
mean that accuracy is more important than expediency in deter-
mining which defendants are truly foreign. 
Most importantly, the purpose of the ATS as stated in Jesner 
would be severely undermined by strict adherence to legal fic-
tions. After all, the goal is to hold US actors responsible for their 
injuries to foreign nationals. Such a goal would be ill-served by a 
self-imposed technicality that allows corporations with strong ties 
to the United States to escape jurisdiction. When a transnational 
corporate enterprise is as strongly tied to the United States as to 
any other nation, such technicalities are unlikely to affect the 
United States’ responsibility in the eyes of foreign nations. Yet 
over-adherence to corporate fictions would allow corporations 
that would otherwise be subject to the ATS to avoid liability easily 
by ensuring that corporate ties to the United States are sustained 
through a separate corporate personality than the one commit-
ting violations. 
For these reasons, when applying the Functional Foreignness 
Test, legal fictions regarding distinct corporate personalities 
should be adhered to only to the extent that they reflect the reality 
of the corporations’ activities.181 This means that when a transna-
tional corporate enterprise as a whole fails the Test, its various 
component corporations should fail as well. If a parent corpora-
tion fails the test, its subsidiaries should consequently fail. This 
 
 181 This rule would not be the first to acknowledge that corporations often consist of 
a cohesive enterprise legally divided into numerous distinct corporations. For antitrust 
purposes, for instance, US law distinguishes anticompetitive activity between distinct  
“entities” from anticompetitive activity between components of “a corporate enterprise  
organized into divisions,” which “must be judged as the conduct of a single actor.”  
Copperweld Corp v Independence Tube Corp, 467 US 752, 769–71 (1984) (explaining why 
“the coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as 
that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act”). Similarly, countries 
such as England may, for legal purposes, recognize a “single economic entity” comprised 
of the various components of a transnational corporation. See Claudia M. Pardinas, The 
Enigma of the Legal Liability of Transnational Corporations, 14 Suffolk Transnatl L J 
405, 453 (1991). 
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rule would ensure that corporations that ought to be held liable 
under the ATS cannot avoid that liability simply by relegating 
violations to subsidiaries that will be entirely beyond US reach. 
2. Why a functional approach is consistent with  
current law. 
This approach might appear to fly in the fact of current prac-
tice. Generally, under the principle of limited liability, the legal 
distinction between parent and subsidiary corporations protects 
each one from liability for the acts of the other. As the Supreme 
Court stated in United States v Bestfoods,182 “It is a general prin-
ciple of corporate law deeply ingrained in our economic and legal 
systems that a parent corporation . . . is not liable for the acts of 
its subsidiaries.”183 The Court explained that even though a par-
ent may own a subsidiary’s stock and therefore elect directors, 
make bylaws, and otherwise control the subsidiary, the “bedrock 
principle” of limited liability nonetheless rules.184 
But the Functional Foreignness Test is about jurisdiction, 
not liability. So the rule of limited liability does not require courts 
to give dispositive weight to legal distinctions between parents 
and subsidiaries for the purpose of the Functional Foreignness 
Test. Indeed, limited liability would still apply in its full force, 
guaranteeing that no corporate entity’s assets would be used  
to pay for the acts of another. The functional view of parent- 
subsidiary relationships for which I advocate would consider the 
entire corporate enterprise’s relationship to the United States 
only for the narrow purpose of determining whether the compo-
nents of that enterprise ought to answer for grave international 
law violations in US courts. But it would not hold any corporation 
liable for the acts of another. This would have the limited effect 
of allowing courts to exercise jurisdiction over otherwise insulated 
subsidiaries. 
Additionally, even the principle of limited liability gives way 
when justice demands it. As the Bestfoods Court explained: 
[T]here is an equally fundamental principle of corporate law, 
applicable to the parent-subsidiary relationship as well as 
 
 182 524 US 51 (1998). 
 183 Id at 61 (quotation marks omitted). 
 184 Id at 62. See also Nina A. Mendleson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder 
Liability for Corporate Torts, 102 Colum L Rev 1203, 1267 (2002); Timothy P. Glynn, Be-
yond “Unlimited” Shareholding Liability: Vicarious Tort Liability for Corporate Officers, 
57 Vand L Rev 329, 356 (2004). 
2019] Legal Fictions and Foreign Frictions 2233 
 
generally, that the corporate veil may be pierced and the 
shareholder held liable for the corporation’s conduct when, 
inter alia, the corporate form would otherwise be misused to 
accomplish certain wrongful purposes, most notably fraud, 
on the shareholder’s behalf.185 
Such cases are a “rare exception,” but they indicate that even lim-
ited liability is not absolute.186 
There is not a single, settled formulation of the federal com-
mon law rule187 for piercing the corporate veil.188 Generally, most 
circuits rely on a fact-intensive analysis focusing on the nature of 
the relationship between the corporation and the shareholders (or 
parent) as well as the risk of allowing injustice if the legal fiction 
of the separate corporate personality were upheld.189 Courts often 
require fraud or some other egregious behavior by an actor in or-
der to hold it liable for the acts of another, but there is also evi-
dence that the federal doctrine—as compared to some state doc-
trines—is somewhat flexible, with more emphasis on federal 
policy.190 In Anderson v Abbot,191 for instance, the Supreme Court 
noted that “the interposition of a corporation will not be allowed 
to defeat a legislative policy, whether that was the aim or only the 
result of the arrangement.”192 
This is not to suggest that the rule of limited liability would 
look different in ATS contexts, or would more frequently allow for 
veil piercing, but it establishes that courts do not always give dis-
positive weight to legal fictions, and that federal policy is a rele-
vant consideration in this regard. In ATS suits, when a sensitive 
federal policy is at stake and the question is jurisdiction rather 
than liability, there is no reason that the outcome should hinge 
on corporate fictions. 
  
 
 185 Bestfoods, 524 US at 52. 
 186 Dole Food Co v Patrickson, 538 US 468, 475 (2003). 
 187 Federal common law would presumably apply to ATS cases given that they arise 
from federal common law causes of action. Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1397 (“Congress enacted 
[the ATS] against the backdrop of the general common law, which in 1789 recognized a 
limited category of torts in violation of the law of nations.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 188 See Joshua E. Kurland, Veil-Piercing in Customs Enforcement Proceedings: The 
Role of Federal Common Law, 23 Tulane J Intl & Comp L 363, 372 (2015) (“The federal 
veil-piercing standards differ somewhat among the various federal circuit courts.”). 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id at 369–71. 
 191 321 US 349 (1944). 
 192 Id at 363. 
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C. Applying the Functional Foreignness Test: The Example of 
Nestlé 
The Functional Foreignness Test would have a modest but 
important effect on ATS liability. Given the various hurdles dis-
cussed in Part II.A, it would only be relevant under certain cir-
cumstances. A transnational corporate enterprise would need to 
violate a universal norm of international law. The violation would 
need to be sufficiently connected to US territory to satisfy per-
sonal jurisdiction and overcome the presumption against extra-
territoriality. Even then, the court would need to determine that 
a US forum is most appropriate, perhaps because redress is not 
available elsewhere. 
The most likely cases to fit this profile are cases of integrated 
global enterprises wherein corporations conducting substantial 
activity in the United States simultaneously commit serious vio-
lations in other parts of the world. The US activity might be tied 
to those violations due to the integrated nature of the enterprise. 
For instance, products sold in the United States might derive 
from injuries committed elsewhere or corporate facilities in the 
United States might direct or oversee the injurious conduct. In 
this narrow but important set of cases, the final hurdle might be 
the Jesner rule. Under a formalistic test, jurisdiction would turn 
entirely on a formality such as whether culpable corporate de-
fendants were initially incorporated abroad. Under the Func-
tional Foreignness Test, courts would look instead to the reality 
of the enterprise’s economic ties to the United States. Jurisdiction 
would attach only if the enterprise were as closely tied to the 
United States as to any other nation. However, once that condi-
tion was satisfied, jurisdiction would survive regardless of any le-
gal formalities. The fact that a defendant was initially incorpo-
rated abroad, or was legally distinct from the portion of the 
enterprise tied to the United States, would not be dispositive. 
For an example of how the Test might be applied, consider 
again the suit against Nestlé. In a supplemental brief before the 
Ninth Circuit, Nestlé USA emphasized that plaintiffs could only 
succeed by attributing to Nestlé USA the actions of its non-US 
affiliates, Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast.193 If this is true, then 
a formalistic rule labelling Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory Coast as 
 
 193 See Supplemental Brief of Nestlé USA, Inc, Doe v Nestle, S.A., No 17-55435, *4–5 
(9th Cir filed May 18, 2018) (available on Westlaw at 2018 WL 2299136) (Nestlé Supple-
mental Brief). 
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foreign corporations—a rule that the Ninth Circuit apparently 
applied without considering alternatives194—will preclude any re-
covery for the plaintiffs. 
However, the Functional Foreignness Test would allow plain-
tiffs’ suit to proceed against both Nestlé SA and Nestlé Ivory 
Coast. Nestlé SA, the original Nestlé corporation, was incorpo-
rated in Switzerland. However, the Nestlé enterprise has strong 
ties with the United States. As of Nestlé’s 2018 Annual Review, 
which does not draw distinctions between Nestlé SA and its many 
subsidiaries, 36.5 percent of Nestlé’s share capital was in the 
United States—more than the 34.9 percent in Switzerland, and 
more than seven times as much as in any other country.195 As a 
result, the nationality of shareholders weighs against a finding of 
foreignness. Regarding the nationality of employees, the report 
stated that approximately 3.1 percent of Nestlé’s employees were 
in Switzerland, whereas 33.9 percent were in the Americas.196 
Though the report did not break down this statistic by country, it 
is likely that most of these employees were in the United States, 
where 77 of Nestlé’s 413 factories were located.197 This is more 
than in any other single country, and only eleven factories were 
located in Switzerland.198 As a result, the nationality of employees 
and the location of corporate facilities both weigh strongly against 
foreignness. Further, 44.9 percent of Nestlé’s sales were in the 
Americas (again, there is no breakdown by country) compared to 
29.4 percent of sales to Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa 
combined, indicating that business with the United States heav-
ily factors against foreignness as well.199 Finally, Nestlé SA’s CEO 
is a US citizen, along with two other members of its twelve-person 
executive board, while four members of the board are Swiss.200 In 
this way, Swiss leadership does not appear to significantly out-
weigh American leadership, which modestly supports a finding 
that Nestlé SA is not foreign. 
Taken as a whole, Nestlé clearly fails the Test because its ties 
to the United States are at least as strong as (and in this case, 
 
 194 See Nestle II, 906 F3d at 1124. 
 195 Annual Review 2018 *59 (Nestlé 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/E2R2-M2US. 
 196 Id at *47. 
 197 Id at *56. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Annual Review 2018 at *47 (cited in note 195). 
 200 See id at 62–63 (listing executive board members). Board member nationalities 
were determined based on CVs available on Nestlé’s website. Executive Board (Nestlé 
2019), archived at http://perma.cc/5225-7LV3. 
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stronger than) its ties to other nations. Though Nestlé SA began 
in Switzerland, Nestlé’s ties to Switzerland are no stronger today 
than its ties to the United States, which contributes enormously 
to its monetary and human capital and serves as a key market for 
its products. In light of this reality, there is no logical basis for 
letting the outcome of the Nestlé litigation hinge on the place 
where Nestlé SA was originally incorporated. Such a formalistic 
rule would undermine the purpose of the ATS by allowing an ac-
tor with close ties to the United States to commit serious viola-
tions against foreign people without consequences. Nestlé admit-
tedly does have strong ties to Switzerland, and Switzerland might 
still object to Nestlé SA being sued in US courts. However, this 
would be equally true of a corporation that began in the United 
States and later developed strong ties to another nation. In other 
words, there is no principled reason to make place of incorpora-
tion the dispositive issue; it simply makes more sense to focus on 
substantive economic ties. 
As a technical matter, Nestlé’s US activity is largely con-
ducted by US subsidiaries of Nestlé. However, this activity ought 
to be viewed as part of a single, transnational corporate enter-
prise for the purposes of the Functional Foreignness Test in light 
of the functional reality of Nestlé’s operations. First, the statistics 
cited above were in a single report from Nestlé’s “global” website, 
Nestle.com, and the report does not distinguish between the op-
erations of Nestlé SA and its various subsidiaries. In fact, the re-
port does not include the term “subsidiary” at all. Nestle.com even 
has a page answering the question, “How many different Nestlé 
companies are there?” by saying, “There is just one Nestlé.”201 
Though this page is merely a marketing tool and is clearly not 
making any legal claim, it nonetheless illustrates the way Nestlé 
conceives of its global enterprise and presents itself to the public. 
This characterization of the Nestlé enterprise stands in stark con-
trast to Nestlé USA’s supplemental brief responding to Jesner, 
which emphasizes its distance from other Nestlé corporations: 
“Nestlé, USA, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestle Hold-
ings, Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary of NIMCO US, Inc., 
which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Nestlé, S.A., a publicly 
traded Swiss corporation.”202 It is only when litigation begins that 
 
 201 How Many Different Nestlé Companies Are There? (Nestlé 2019), archived at 
http://perma.cc/6NXZ-YVYN. 
 202 Nestlé Supplemental Brief at *i (cited in note 193). 
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Nestlé—a transnational company whose global activities com-
prise an integrated enterprise—is suddenly framed as a dis-
jointed conglomerate of distinct personalities. As a result, the le-
gal fiction distinguishing Nestlé USA from its Swiss parent does 
not prevent Nestlé SA it from failing the Functional Foreignness 
Test. 
For the same reason, Nestlé Ivory Coast fails the Functional 
Foreignness Test as a part of a larger corporate enterprise that 
fails the Test. In this manner, Nestlé SA—which has sufficient 
US ties to justify an ATS suit against it—cannot escape liability 
by shifting responsibility for its human rights violations to a for-
eign subsidiary. To reiterate, this does not mean Nestlé SA or any 
other component of the Nestlé enterprise will be held liable for 
the acts of another; this would only be possible if typical veil-
piercing requirements were satisfied. It simply means that the 
United States, as the country most substantially implicated in 
Nestlé’s global activity, might be able to exercise jurisdiction over 
Nestlé and its subsidiaries in order to hold each one accountable 
for its own violations.203 
Ultimately, the Functional Foreignness Test would allow for-
mer child slaves the opportunity to face the perpetrators of their 
slavery that are closely tied to the United States in court. A for-
malistic rule, on the other hand, would deny this opportunity 
based solely on a technicality. 
D. The Separation of Powers 
Finally, I conclude by responding briefly to an objection that 
is sure to arise: that a court’s application of the Functional For-
eignness Test might violate the constitutional separation of pow-
ers. Even if the Functional Foreignness Test furthers the purpose 
of the ATS and is consistent with other areas of law, one might 
argue that this is a question for the political branches, not the 
courts. A proponent of this view might say that no matter how 
compelling the arguments in favor of a more expansive view of 
 
 203 In the case of subsidiaries such as Nestlé Ivory Coast, personal jurisdiction may 
still pose a significant barrier if the subsidiary itself does not conduct business with the 
United States. This may be overcome in some cases, and a more realistic view of parent-
subsidiary relationships for the purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction might be 
beneficial for many of the reasons discussed in this Comment. However, the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction for transnational corporate actors is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
Moreover, even if personal jurisdiction ultimately bars ATS cases against subsidiaries 
such as Nestlé Ivory Coast, allowing suits against actors such as Nestlé SA under the 
Functional Foreignness Test will still be a significant step in the right direction. 
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ATS jurisdiction—whether based on principles of justice, statu-
tory interpretation, policy considerations, or others—such argu-
ments are ultimately trumped by the separation of powers, which 
suggests that the ATS, as a statute regarding foreign relations, 
should not be extended in any manner without input from Con-
gress or the Executive.204 However, the Functional Foreignness 
Test overcomes this objection for several reasons. 
First, given the mystery that surrounds the initial goal and 
intended implications of the ATS, the question is not whether to 
expand the ATS, but rather what the ATS entails in the first 
place. There is no settled body of jurisprudence that could be said 
to constitute the ATS’s traditional application; it had virtually no 
application whatsoever until it was suddenly applied in expansive 
and controversial ways, beginning with Filartiga. But even 
though it was several centuries ago, Congress did enact the ATS, 
and deference to Congress should therefore mean an attempt to 
determine the ATS’s meaning as accurately, but not necessarily 
as restrictively, as possible.205 
This argument might seem abstract or naïve to the realities 
of foreign relations as ordinarily directed by Congress and the Ex-
ecutive Branch. To be sure, one might argue that no matter how 
the ATS is understood, it is being applied in new ways that po-
tentially interfere with foreign relations. Arguing that this new 
application is not an “expansion” may seem like a semantic trick. 
Yet even a more grounded view of the ATS, in light of its historic 
use and its purpose as formulated by Jesner, still suggests that a 
functional approach to defining foreign corporations is not an ex-
pansion and is unlikely to step on the toes of the legislature. To 
demonstrate this point, I will show that although Jesner advo-
cates judicial restraint, implementing its holding through a func-
tional standard is ultimately consistent with its reasoning. While 
 
 204 See, for example, Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1403 (“[S]eparation-of-powers concerns that 
counsel against courts creating private rights of action apply with particular force in the 
context of the ATS,” which implicates “foreign-policy concerns” most appropriately ad-
dressed by the “political branches, not the Judiciary.”); Sosa, 542 US at 748 (Scalia con-
curring in part and in the judgment) (warning that the lower courts, in interpreting the 
ATS too expansively, were headed down a path leading “directly into confrontation with 
the political branches”); id at 727 (Souter) (majority) (stating that courts should be “par-
ticularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in 
managing foreign affairs”). 
 205 For a discussion probing Congress’s original intent in passing the ATS, including 
the need to fulfill that intent without unduly expanding the statute, see Ingrid Wuerth, 
The Alien Tort Statute and Federal Common Law: A New Approach, 85 Notre Dame L Rev 
1931, 1941–43 (2010).  
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courts are properly wary of interfering with the political branches’ 
power over foreign relations, neither Jesner nor the ATS itself 
forecloses some judicial role in determining the scope of ATS ju-
risdiction over transnational corporations. 
A close read of the majority’s reasoning in Jesner supports 
this view. Jesner discussed the Court’s “general reluctance to ex-
tend judicially created private rights of action,” arguing that “the 
Legislature is in the better position to consider if the public inter-
est would be served by imposing a new substantive legal liabil-
ity.”206 It counseled against creating a damages remedy if there 
are even “sound reasons” to believe Congress might disagree with 
that remedy.207 Given the foreign policy implications of the ATS, 
the Court reasoned that this cautious approach applied with “par-
ticular force” to the ATS.208 In its most skeptical remarks, the 
Court even casts doubt on whether a new cause of action under 
the ATS would ever be a proper application of judicial discretion 
under Sosa.209 Considered as a whole, Jesner depicts an extremely 
narrow role for the courts in permitting ATS suits. 
At first glance, this may appear damning for any application 
of the ATS besides the most conservative possible interpretation. 
However, the Court’s reasoning essentially focuses on two prob-
lems with allowing ATS suits against foreign corporations. First, 
it would extend the United States’ current role in policing the ac-
tivities of foreign entities. Second, it would risk negative diplo-
matic responses. Neither of these concerns counsel against a func-
tional standard for identifying foreign corporations. 
The distinction between foreign and domestic corporations is 
a novel rule. So it is difficult to convincingly say that one way of 
distinguishing foreign corporations from others is an extension of 
the ATS, while a different interpretation simply upholds the sta-
tus quo. There is no clear status quo regarding the ATS gener-
ally—it was only used twice over two hundred years, then sud-
denly wielded by parties in a series of recent and controversial 
cases—let alone its limitation to nonforeign corporations. Given 
this lack of precedent, taking a functional approach that consid-
ers why foreign corporate defendants have been precluded makes 
sense. The answer is that the ATS is about enabling the United 
States to take responsibility for the acts of its nationals rather 
 
 206 Jesner, 138 S Ct at 1402. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id at 1403. 
 209 Id. 
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than enabling it to police external actors.210 In light of this goal, 
and the fact that there is little other congressional intent or prec-
edent to look to for guidance, a functional standard that focuses 
on the defendant’s relationship with the United States is best 
suited to determining the contours of ATS jurisdiction over trans-
national corporations. 
Even if courts wish to take a conservative approach based on 
separation-of-powers concerns arising from foreign policy impli-
cations, they should at least be able to indicate how an alternative 
approach might cause diplomatic friction. The judiciary is not so 
inept that such a baseline inquiry into the consequences of its  
decisions is too far beyond its capacity. In fact, such an inquiry  
is necessary to determine what issues implicate separation-of- 
powers concerns in the first place. In Jesner, the risk of causing 
diplomatic friction was obvious given Arab Bank’s prominent role 
in Jordan’s economy.211 However, for corporations that fail the  
Functional Foreignness Test, the United States is putting its own 
economic interests on the line as much as much as the interests 
of any other country. 
Moreover, refraining from imposing liability on corporations 
closely tied to the United States would mean that the ATS’s goal 
could not be achieved. Foreign nationals would be harmed by 
what are essentially US actors, and no forum would be available 
for redress—the very circumstance the ATS was designed to pre-
clude.212 In other words, the apparently conservative approach 
could be the choice that would cause diplomatic friction, so that 
courts cannot simply err on one side or the other to avoid such a 
result. Instead, they ought to judge whether each case runs a risk 
of causing such frictions, thereby implementing Congress’ chosen 
policy as described in Jesner. 
In a similar vein, courts should not discount the long-term 
goal of reducing diplomatic friction. When the United States holds 
corporations accountable for severe violations of international 
law, short-term friction related to particular defendants will 
likely be outweighed by long-term diplomatic benefits arising 
from protecting the rights of other foreign actors and promoting 
international law and global justice. These goals are better served 
if the judiciary, rather than the political branches, is the one ex-
erting a broader vision of US jurisdiction over international bad 
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actors; this reinforces the perception of the United States promot-
ing the rule of law rather than making political maneuvers. Even 
if Switzerland does not like the idea of US jurisdiction over Nestlé 
SA, the international community—which has expressed outrage 
over Nestlé’s use of child slavery and sought to curb it—may well 
applaud the United States for taking responsibility for actors 
closely tied to it. 
CONCLUSION 
The Jesner rule precluding foreign corporations as ATS de-
fendants should not be applied in a strict, formalistic manner. In-
stead, courts should determine ATS jurisdiction in light of the cor-
poration’s functional relationship with the United States. In this 
way, the ATS will best achieve its primary goal of providing a fo-
rum for redress in cases in which US actors have injured foreign 
nationals. Such a standard will not be too costly or inconvenient 
due to the narrow class of cases that give rise to ATS suits in the 
first place. Moreover, it will not allow important foreign policy is-
sues to be resolved based on a technicality. The Jesner court af-
firmed the United States’ responsibility to hold its actors account-
able for violations against foreign nationals. To honor that goal, 
corporations cannot be provided loopholes for escaping justice. 
